Stretching across the Himalayas, the India-China border is 3488-km long. The absence of a demarcated border and lack of consensus as to where the Line of Actual Control (LAC) lies, often leads to ‘incursions’ and standoff between the two armies.
The LAC has three sectors. In the Western Sector, India considers the Johnson Line (established in1865), which includes Aksai Chin in the Indian territory as its boundary whereas China claims the MaCartney- MacDonald Line (established in 1899), which includes areas up to the Indus Valley. In the Eastern Sector, i.e, Arunachal Pradesh, the Indian claims are as per the McMohan Line (established in The Simla Convention of 1914), following the principle of water shed, whereas China does not recognise this Line at all as it claims the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as its own. The Middle Sector, opposite Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, also has some pockets of disputed areas.
Prior to April 2020, there was a border dispute management mechanism in place wherein patrols of both the sides used to go up to certain points and no structures were built in the areas of differing perception, as per the agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013. These agreements were being followed to avoid clashes and build confidence on both sides.
From the highly positive period of 2014-2019, when Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping met 18 times and the relations between the two countries improved, a sudden downturn in April 2020, took everyone by surprise. Even as China was building roads and creating military infrastructure on its side of the LAC, it objected to the network of roads, tunnels and bridges that were being built by India side since PM Modi assumed office in 2014 – China was not used to seeing India asserting its position.
Beginning May 2020, China started bringing in a large number of troops in Eastern Ladakh, in total disregard to ibid agreements. It denied access to our patrols in areas of differing perceptions, leading to various clashes, including that of Galwan on Jun 15, 2020, in which 20 Indian soldiers were martyred, and Chinese suffered many more casualties. The two armies thereafter ranged against each other all along the LAC, with over 50,000 troops from each side deployed with tanks, Howitzers, surface-to-air missiles, drones and the likes, in Eastern Ladakh. Additionally, 90000 PLA troops are deployed in forward areas across Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim with matching mirror deployment by India.
Following this, several meetings were held at the Corps Commander and diplomatic levels between both the countries to resolve the border standoff, but there was no tangible outcome.
On October 21, 2024, an MEA (External Affairs Ministry) announcement that India and China had reached an understanding over the outstanding issues pertaining to the LAC in Eastern Ladakh since April 2020, and a bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi in Russia marked the closure of a difficult period in relations between the two nations. By now, the two armies have completed the phased disengagement and verification process, both on the ground as well as through aerial surveillance by drones and satellites, in areas, including Depsang Plains and Charding Ninglung Nallah Track junction near Demchok. Our patrols are now having unrestricted access to these areas (Partrolling Points 10, 11, 11A, 12, 13 in Depsang and two key Patrolling Points in Charding Ninglung Nala Track Junction near Demchok), as was being done prior to April 2020.
A Significant Agreement
As China had been totally intransigent in negotiations for the last four-and-a-half years, there are considerable speculations on whether this agreement on border patrols and disengagement actually translates into a better deal on ground and reduction of threat in future; whether Beijing wants to go on a positive trajectory, or is it simply using this as an interim measure to get India to lower its guard. Such fears are due to the huge differential between the two countries in terms of an economy of China’s $18 trillion to India’s $3.93 trillion and the size and sophistication of its armed forces. In addition, China is an aggressive country that has been continuously expanding its territory, both on land and in the sea, which is detrimental to its neighbours.
Notwithstanding all this, we certainly need to commend our diplomatic and military efforts which have resulted in this agreement. Firstly, because in the midst of two highly destructive and destabilising wars in Europe and Middle East, the two most populous, big economic Asian giants have moved towards rapprochement from the brink of border related hostilities, which could have led to a larger conflagration in 2020. Secondly, for the last four-and-a-half years, there had not been any meeting between the two top leaders. Political reengagement has now commenced with PM Modi and President Xi meetings (in Kazan) and Foreign Minister and NSA level dialogues – all of which reduces the possibility of any flare up. Thirdly, the resolution of standoff at Depsang and Demchok ends the five-year-old crisis and stabilises the border region once again. So far, both the sides have demonstrated sincerity in implementing their part of the commitment. As per the latest information available, India has regained access not only for its patrols but has also earned the grazing rights for its herders, which was one of the pre-requisites set by it in 2022, for normalising its relations with China. This agreement helps ease military tensions and de-escalation along the LAC. Bilateral ties in other areas, including connectivity and business, will also benefit once normalcy is restored. Hence, one cannot underestimate the importance of this agreement.
Reasons China signed this agreement
The continued deployment of troops along the border is a huge burden for both the countries, militarily as well as economically. An economic slump in China since the outbreak of Covid-19 (4.8 per cent GDP growth rate in 2024) and its efforts at hollowing out some of its industries and absorption of the same by other countries has made President Xi unpopular and vulnerable to mass civil unrest.
President Xi’s confidants, most of whom are inclined towards military and not diplomatic solutions to territorial disputes, have recommended that he works for the control of Taiwan by 2027. Such an achievement will ensure a fourth term for Xi and a place in history alongside Mao.
India’s strong stand under Prime Minister Modi, viz, 72 days standoff in Doklam, Galwan clashes wherein the PLA suffered heavy casualties, quick deployment of forces in large numbers in Ladakh, India’s blanket refusal to participate in China’s BRI project, opening up of the third representative office of Taiwan in India, India welcoming US congressional delegation which met Dalai Lama, India’s participation in Quad summit, and hosting military exercises like Malabar, Tarang Shakti and its participation in maritime surveillance with its Quad partners are some of the points which would have made China conclude that a full-fledged war with rising India which is also equipped with nuclear power will be at a great cost to it and may not yield desired results.
India must end its dependence on China in pharmaceuticals APIs, solar panels, lithium-ion batteries, IC chips etc, either by creating alternative supply chains or producing indigenously
China is increasingly feeling the heat from the West for its continuous support to Russia and it is not sure as to how the new President of the US will approach India and China. Along with this, China also has a feeling that its larger goal of ‘cautioning’ India has been achieved.
What Next
On October 26, Foreign Minister S Jaishankar stated that India-China agreement does not mean that all issues between the two countries have been resolved. Such an agreement will take time in its implementation given the vast swathe of border region, terrain and prevailing weather conditions. After stabilisation at Depsang and Demchok, India’s focus will shift towards restoration of patrolling rights in the “no patrol buffer zones” established in 2022, at Galwan, north bank of Pangong Tso, Kailash Range and the larger Gogra-Hot Spring areas.
New buffer zones in the areas of differing perception, if agreed by both the sides, can be created to minimise the possibility of a bloodshed. The disengagement is expected to lead to de-escalation of lingering conflicts in sensitive areas and eventual de-induction of rival soldiers through talks. With its success, another similar agreement – with suitable modifications – can be done for the Eastern Sector as well. To ensure that the agreement remains durable, negotiations at various levels will have to be conducted patiently over a long period of time. Neither side will like to dilute its military presence unless there is confidence that other side will not exploit it. This requires trust, which is unfortunately very low. However, the process has started with the leaders meeting at Kazan. It takes time to rebuild confidence. India will do well to follow the dictum of ‘Trust and Verify’’ and keep talking, building deterrence and creating self-reliance.
India must end its dependence on China in pharmaceuticals APIs, solar panels, lithium-ion batteries, IC chips etc, either by creating alternative supply chains or producing indigenously. These are sine quo non for national security. Enhancing deterrence will mean that the Defence budget will have to be increased. Deterrence is costly but it prevents war, which is costlier. Other issues like China-Pak relations, Tibet related issues, India’s trade deficit with China, China’s Middle Kingdom Syndrome and great power mentality are all deep-rooted problems, and may take a long, long time. We cannot take any situation as a permanent one. The issues with China do not end with an agreement on disengagement and border patrolling. But what has happened, is good for both the nations.
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