For decades, discussions about China’s military rise have been dominated by one central question that how does Beijing plan to challenge the United States? The answer has usually revolved around aircraft carriers, advanced missiles, stealth aircraft, and the growing reach of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Yet a closer examination of Chinese military doctrine reveals a more complex picture. While the United States remains China’s principal strategic competitor, Beijing’s assessment of other rivals has become increasingly nuanced.
The PLA, the world’s largest standing military, is in the midst of an unprecedented modernization campaign. Its expanding inventory of warships, stealth fighters, hypersonic weapons, space-based systems, and networked capabilities reflects ambitions that extend far beyond regional defense. However, Chinese military planning is not based on a simple ranking of enemies. Instead, it evaluates potential adversaries according to specific operational theatres, strategic objectives, and vulnerabilities.
Within this framework, India has emerged as a challenge that Beijing can neither dismiss nor fully dominate. Unlike maritime rivals such as the United States and Japan, India presents China with a distinct continental contest where geography, logistics, escalation management, and nuclear deterrence intersect. The result is a strategic rivalry that occupies a unique place in China’s military thinking.
System destruction warfare and China’s view of rivals
The foundation of modern PLA strategy lies in concepts articulated in its Science of Military Strategy texts. Central among these is the doctrine of “Systems Confrontation” and “System Destruction Warfare.” Rather than seeking victory through direct platform-to-platform competition, China aims to disrupt an opponent’s entire operational system. The objective is to disable critical nodes such as satellites, command networks, communications infrastructure, data links, airbases, and even political decision-making mechanisms before an adversary can effectively respond.
This doctrine influences how Beijing evaluates every competitor. Military strength is not measured solely by troop numbers or weapons inventories. Instead, the PLA assesses how integrated an opponent’s systems are, where vulnerabilities exist, and how various military and non-military tools can be employed to paralyse them.
Supporting this strategic framework are several complementary concepts. “Active Defense” provides justification for decisive counterattacks, including actions that may begin pre-emptively in order to seize the initiative. “Intelligentized Warfare” seeks to exploit artificial intelligence and advanced technologies to accelerate decision-making beyond human speed. Meanwhile, the “Three Warfares” doctrine combines public opinion operations, psychological warfare, and legal warfare to shape the strategic environment before conflict even begins.These principles guide China’s assessment of every rival, from Washington to New Delhi.
The United States remains the benchmark
Despite the emergence of multiple challenges, the United States continues to occupy a singular place in Chinese strategic calculations. The PLA’s understanding of American military power has been shaped significantly by observations of U.S. operations since the 1991 Gulf War. Chinese military reforms, training exercises, and force development programmes frequently use the United States as their primary reference point.
At the Zhurihe training base, the PLA’s dedicated Blue Force opposition units are modelled explicitly on American and allied military tactics. Similar efforts exist within naval and joint-force training, where Chinese personnel routinely simulate U.S. operational methods.
Beijing acknowledges several enduring American advantages. These include a global alliance structure, extensive logistical capabilities, sophisticated command-and-control networks, advanced C4ISR systems, significant expertise in undersea warfare, and decades of combat experience accumulated across multiple theatres.
At the same time, Chinese planners identify what they regard as vulnerabilities. These include dependence on high-value assets such as aircraft carriers, extensive reliance on space-based systems, and what Beijing perceives as limited tolerance within the United States for prolonged wars involving heavy casualties.
In a Taiwan contingency, the PLA believes that geography and anti-access capabilities could provide a temporary opportunity to establish a military fait accompli before the full weight of American power can be brought to bear.
Taiwan and Japan: The immediate strategic challenge
No issue drives Chinese military modernization more directly than Taiwan. Beijing does not classify Taiwan as a foreign adversary but as an internal matter and a core national interest. Consequently, much of the PLA’s modernization effort, including amphibious warfare capabilities, rocket force expansion, and increasingly sophisticated joint operations, is designed around a potential Taiwan scenario.
Chinese planners appear confident that Taiwanese forces alone could not prevent a determined PLA campaign. However, the challenge lies in conducting a complex cross-strait invasion while simultaneously preventing intervention by the United States and Japan.
Taiwan’s adoption of a “porcupine strategy,” centred on asymmetric defence measures intended to increase costs and delay military advances, has complicated Chinese calculations. This combination of invasion requirements and external intervention risks makes Taiwan the most demanding operational scenario in PLA planning.
Japan occupies a similarly important position in Chinese assessments. Beijing views Tokyo as the most capable partner of the United States in East Asia and a critical pillar of the First Island Chain. The extensive American military presence in Japan means that any Taiwan-related conflict would inevitably involve Japanese territory and infrastructure. Chinese planners therefore regard American bases in Japan as key targets that would need to be neutralised in a wider conflict.
The PLA also holds considerable professional respect for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, particularly its anti-submarine warfare expertise. This capability is viewed as a direct threat to China’s nuclear-armed submarine fleet. Recent Japanese acquisitions of counter-strike missile systems have further heightened Chinese concerns, leading some analysts within China to view Japan not merely as a defensive partner of the United States but as a potential offensive actor capable of striking targets on the Chinese mainland.
Why India matters more than China admits
If the United States represents China’s primary strategic competitor and Taiwan its most urgent contingency, India occupies a different but increasingly significant category. The rivalry between the two Asian powers is shaped not by maritime manoeuvres or island chains but by mountains, difficult terrain, logistics, and escalation control. Responsibility for managing this challenge falls primarily upon the PLA’s Western Theater Command.
The importance of this front became evident during the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. The confrontation demonstrated that both countries were prepared to compete aggressively while simultaneously seeking to avoid escalation beyond the nuclear threshold.
Chinese assessments indicate substantial respect for India’s military capabilities. The PLA recognises the scale of the Indian Army, its combat experience, and the effectiveness of specialised high-altitude formations operating in some of the world’s most demanding conditions.
However, Beijing also believes it possesses important advantages. Over the past two decades, China has invested heavily in infrastructure across Tibet and Xinjiang. New highways, rail networks, and airbases have transformed the PLA’s ability to move personnel, equipment, and supplies rapidly across the region.
This infrastructure buildup has strengthened Chinese confidence that it can sustain and deploy forces more efficiently along the Line of Actual Control than India can during the early stages of a crisis. According to this assessment, Beijing believes it could achieve limited military objectives and manage escalation before India’s larger ground forces complete mobilisation.
This confidence does not translate into complacency. Unlike several smaller regional actors, India is viewed as a nuclear-armed competitor with substantial military capabilities and strategic depth. Geography prevents quick or decisive victories, making logistics and endurance central to any future confrontation.
AUKUS and the gray-zone contest
Beyond its immediate rivals, China is increasingly focused on emerging strategic developments. Australia’s participation in the AUKUS partnership has significantly altered Chinese perceptions. Once viewed primarily as an economic partner, Australia now attracts considerable attention within Chinese public opinion campaigns and legal warfare efforts.
Of particular concern are plans for nuclear-powered submarines. From Beijing’s perspective, such vessels would be capable of operating at long distances, tracking Chinese ballistic missile submarines, and contributing to potential maritime blockades. More importantly, AUKUS strengthens the broader U.S.-led network that China’s system-destruction doctrine seeks to undermine.
Meanwhile, countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam are approached through a different lens. Rather than being treated as conventional military equals, they are viewed as participants in ongoing gray-zone competition. Through coordinated use of the Maritime Militia, Coast Guard, and PLA Navy, combined with public opinion and legal warfare, China seeks incremental gains without crossing the threshold into full-scale war.
Taken together, the PLA’s doctrines, training patterns, and procurement priorities reveal that Beijing does not view its rivals through a single hierarchy. The United States remains the overarching benchmark and pacing threat. Taiwan continues to drive force development. Japan represents the most capable regional military partner of Washington. AUKUS signals the expansion of a long-term strategic challenge.
Yet India stands apart. It is China’s most consequential land-based rival, a nuclear-armed power whose challenge cannot be measured solely through technology or naval reach. In Beijing’s evolving military calculus, India’s importance is growing, not because China fears an immediate conflict, but because it recognises that geography, military capability, and strategic endurance make India a competitor that simply cannot be ignored.
