For nearly eight decades, Pakistan defined its national identity by distancing itself from civilisational past. It’s school textbooks, political discourse and ideology largely projected Pakistan’s history as beginning with the arrival of Muhammad bin Qasim in Sindh in 711 CE, while pre-Islamic civilisation was often treated as irrelevant. Today, however, that narrative appears to be undergoing a remarkable shift.
Amid growing tensions with India over the Indus Waters Treaty, Pakistani politicians, academics and diplomats have increasingly begun invoking the Indus Valley Civilisation, Harappa, Mohenjo-daro, Taxila, Sanskrit and even ancient Hindu-era personalities such as Panini as part of Pakistan’s historical inheritance. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has openly acknowledged that the ancestors of most Pakistani Muslims were Hindus, while Information Minister Attaullah Tarar has declared Pakistanis to be the “children of the Indus”, claiming civilisational ownership of the river system.
The sudden embrace raises an obvious question that ‘Why is Pakistan trying to redefine its identity now?’
Pakistan’s foundation largely rested on the Two-Nation Theory, separating Muslims politically from Hindus. Over time, the state increasingly promoted an identity linked with Central Asia, Persia and Arabia. Turkish rulers, Arab conquerors and Mughal emperors occupied place in nation’s history, while indigenous civilisation received comparatively little emphasis.
Today, however, a different narrative is emerging. Pakistan is increasingly speaking of the Indus Valley Civilisation, Gandhara, Taxila, Harappa, Mohenjo-daro and Panini. Universities in Lahore have introduced Sanskrit courses, with scholars arguing that the language forms part of Pakistan’s own historical legacy. Cultural events like celebrating Basant Panchami, performing Kathak and pre-Islamic archaeological sites are also receiving greater public visibility than before.
This is not merely an academic development. It reflects a broader search beyond Arabisation.
The turning point appears closely connected to India’s decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance after the Pahalgam terrorist attack.
For Pakistan, the Indus River is not simply a source of water; it is central to its agriculture, and economy. Consequently, Islamabad has launched an international diplomatic campaign portraying itself as the natural heir and custodian of the Indus civilisation. They are also taking foreign diplomats to Taxila, the historic centre of Buddhist and Gandharan civilisation.
Official statements increasingly argue that because Harappa, Mohenjo-daro and much of the Indus basin lie within present-day Pakistan, the country’s claim over the Indus carries historical as well as geographical legitimacy.
Interestingly, Pakistan’s new discourse does not describe these traditions as Hindu. Instead, they are increasingly presented as “South Asian heritage.”
Whether discussing Sanskrit, the Indus Valley Civilisation, Harappa or Basant Panchami, the argument often follows a common pattern that these traditions are said to belong to the region rather than to Hindu civilisation. This framing enables Pakistan to take advantage of its ancient past without appearing to challenge its Islamic national identity.
The rebranding is no longer limited to Harappa, Mohenjo-daro, or the Indus Valley Civilisation.
Pakistan is increasingly attempting to associate itself with traditional Indian cultural symbols such as the saree. Politicians now describe Pakistanis as the “children of the Indus.”
There have also been discussions about restoring the ancient names of cities and highlighting their pre-Islamic identities. Although many such proposals are later withdrawn under pressure from Islamist groups, these repeated attempts also raise the question of why Pakistan is doing this.
Some voices in Pakistan are now also seeking to connect themselves with the Rigveda because it was composed in that region. Notably, the Rigveda predates the arrival of Islam in the region by several millennia. Regardless of academic debates, it belongs to the ancient Vedic-Hindu civilisation that flourished long before the emergence of Pakistan or Islam. For centuries after the advent of Islam, the Rigveda was neither preserved nor accepted within Pakistan’s dominant religious tradition.
A similar pattern is visible with Yoga. Rooted in the Vedas, the Upanishads, and the broader Hindu philosophical tradition, Yoga has for millennia been an integral part of Hindu civilisation. Yet Pakistan is increasingly seeking to portray Yoga as a universal practice while distancing it from its Hindu origins.
These developments contrast sharply with earlier decades, when many of these very traditions were viewed primarily through a religious lens and were often referred to as “Hindu.”
Over the years, attacks on minority communities and damage to temples and gurdwaras have repeatedly been reported in Pakistan. Hindus and Sikhs continue to struggle for protection, rights, and dignity in the Islamic nation.
One reason Pakistan may be doing this is that it is facing severe economic challenges and is attempting to improve its image as a hub of terrorism. At the same time, it is seeking to draw global attention to the Indus Waters issue after India placed the treaty in abeyance.
Ironically, even within Pakistan, this shift has generated criticism. Many social media users have accused the government of promoting a “Hindu past” or acting against the country’s Islamic identity.
