Lebanon is once again facing a crucial moment. In March 2026, Hezbollah launched missiles into Israel, thereby opening a new front of the war, following the outbreak of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran and the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The fragile political, economic, and security environment of Lebanon has exacerbated the country’s political and economic crisis, which has since intensified. For the first time since the Lebanese Shiite party initiated the war against Israel in October 2023 by attacking in support of Hamas and later by supporting Iran in March this year, Tehran has directly intervened to rescue it. In response to an Israeli airstrike on a southern suburb of Beirut on the evening of June 7, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched 11 ballistic missiles that were directed toward northern Israel. Despite the Iranians’ efforts, the intense Israeli assaults have diminished Hezbollah’s military capabilities up to a significant extent. It is exceedingly challenging for Hezbollah to replenish its strategic arsenals in the absence of a Syrian “land bridge,” although it now produces drones locally.
Until recently, Iran’s support made the Shia Islamist group the most potent non-state actor in the West Asia. It possessed an extensive arsenal of rockets and missiles, as well as tens of thousands of foot soldiers. Nevertheless, the political and military influence of Hezbollah has significantly decreased in recent years. Since 2023, Israel has diminished its leadership and rank-and-file.
Additionally, Hezbollah has lost the support of its key allies; in the case of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, insurgents overthrew it, while Israel and the USA militarily degraded Iran. Hezbollah’s origins as an armed resistance movement against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon have been gradually diluted over the past decades as a result of its involvement in the Syrian civil war and its pursuit of regional objectives in collaboration with its primary sponsor, Iran.
The repercussions of these events have been a decline in the support of Hezbollah in Lebanese society and a reduction in its regional reputation as a formidable armed group. This resulted in Hezbollah being in a relatively vulnerable position in the ongoing conflict with Israel. On the domestic front also, pressure on Hezbollah is increasing as the Lebanese parliament elected Joseph Aoun, a former army commander, as its new president in January 2025.
In his inaugural address, the new president explicitly stated that he desired the state to maintain the monopoly over armaments. Hezbollah was the sole Lebanese armed group that refused to abandon its weapons following the 1975–1990 civil war, contending that its arms were essential for combating Israeli occupying troops in southern Lebanon.
The international community, through the UN Security Council, has repeatedly requested Hezbollah to disarm. Nevertheless, Hezbollah has consistently disregarded these requests. They disregarded UN Resolution 1701, which mandated the establishment of a zone devoid of armed personnel, with the exception of the Lebanese army. They disregarded the Lebanese Taif Agreement and UN Resolution 1559, which ended the Lebanese Civil War and called for the disbandment and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
In the past, Hezbollah has demonstrated that it has no intention of ever laying down its armaments. Critics view the situation as a unique chance to disarm the group, given its military and economic vulnerabilities. To be more precise, Hezbollah has become increasingly socially and politically isolated in Lebanon. In July 2024, a survey was conducted, revealing that Hezbollah’s support outside the Shia community was at its lowest point in history, with only 30 per cent of the Lebanese population placing their trust in the party (Roche and Robbins 2024). The party’s involvement in numerous sectarian conflicts with various religious communities in Lebanon over the past few years has been a significant factor in this development.
It is accurate to assert that Hezbollah is currently in its most challenging situation since its inception. The party’s isolation within Lebanon and the strikes inflicted by Israel render it unlikely that the situation will improve in the near future. At the same time, Hezbollah is unlikely to disappear; it will continue to exist due to its strong, disciplined, and organized political and militant structure, along with the ongoing support from Iran.
At the same time, the party benefits from the absence of a democratic and inclusive political alternative in Lebanon, as well as a severe economic crisis and a dysfunctional state. Therefore, any attempt to forcibly dismantle Hezbollah may result in a new conflict in Lebanon. The key to loosening Hezbollah’s hold is to erode its Shia political base by filling the vacuum left by the state to provide the services a functional government should, which Hezbollah has long supplied.
Effective service delivery will undermine the narrative that Hezbollah’s marginalisation is intended to marginalize the Shia. Therefore, to disarm Hezbollah without reverting to sectarian disorder, Lebanon must take measures that both bolster the growing disillusionment of the Shia community with Hezbollah and, more generally, convince the Lebanese that a state that currently lacks credibility can actually deliver. To convince Lebanon’s Shia that they will not be left vulnerable to Israel or a Sunni-dominated Syria in the absence of Hezbollah’s armaments, tangible programs should be implemented.
