New Delhi: Acknowledging the rampant misuse of public interest litigation (PIL) for ulterior motives and the pursuit of personal agendas, the Supreme Court on Wednesday observed that it would have dismissed a PIL petition had it been filed by a lawyers’ body currently challenging the Sabarimala practice that bars the entry of women of menstruating age.
The remark was made by a nine-judge bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justices B V Nagarathna, M M Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, A G Masih, P B Varale, R Mahadevan and Joymalya Bagchi. The observation came during submissions by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, who argued that the Sabarimala custom was not challenged by a devotee of Lord Ayyappa and contended that the Supreme Court had earlier struck it down as unconstitutional due to a misreading and misapplication of the “constitutional morality” doctrine to matters of faith, belief and religious custom.
Mehta submitted that the attributes of deity Ayyappa at Sabarimala, who is regarded by devotees as a “Naistik Brahmachari,” cannot be examined through what he described as a “Western-imported” concept of constitutional morality. He argued that this doctrine is meant to test the validity of actions of the state or constitutional authorities, and not to scrutinise deeply held religious beliefs and practices that are inherently beyond judicial determination.
Debate on constitutional morality and religious practices
Justice B V Nagarathna concurred with the submission to an extent, observing that even if the lawyers’ body had approached the court by way of a civil suit, the case would likely have been dismissed for lack of cause of action. Chief Justice Surya Kant agreed with this reasoning but added an important caveat, noting that the PIL in question had been entertained nearly two decades ago, in 2006, and that a judgment had already been delivered. He emphasised that the present bench is tasked with determining the scope and limits of judicial intervention in matters concerning religion.
During the hearing, Mehta also raised concerns about what he termed the “corrupting influence” of a Western mindset in judicial reasoning, particularly referencing the judgment in the Joseph Shine case, which decriminalised adultery. He pointed out that the law was struck down on the grounds that it violated women’s dignity, liberty and equality by restricting sexual autonomy. While clarifying that he had no objection to the outcome of the case, Mehta argued that fidelity is an obligation applicable equally to both men and women in a marriage. Therefore, he said, a legal provision discouraging extramarital relationships cannot be characterised as curbing sexual freedom.
He further contended that societal norms had been incorrectly labelled as “mob morality,” and criticised the use of constitutional morality to invalidate such norms. According to him, this approach reflects a problematic expansion of judicial reasoning into areas traditionally governed by social and cultural values.
Justice Nagarathna responded by noting that concepts of morality are not static. “What was considered immoral and obscene in the 1950s is no longer viewed in the same way today,” she said, adding that many earlier standards are now regarded as narrow-minded or outdated. However, she also emphasised that public morality continues to evolve, and its dynamic nature must be acknowledged.
Concerns over misuse of PIL and locus standi
A significant part of the hearing focused on the issue of locus standi, the legal standing required to file a petition, particularly in the context of PILs. Addressing the question of whether an individual not belonging to a religious denomination can challenge its practices through a PIL, Mehta argued that such interventions should be restricted.
He traced the origins of PIL jurisprudence to the Supreme Court’s 1984 judgment in the Bandhua Mukti Morcha case, where the concept was developed as a tool to enable marginalised and disadvantaged groups, who lacked access to courts, to seek enforcement of their fundamental rights. At that time, the court adopted a liberal approach to locus standi, allowing public-spirited individuals to file petitions on behalf of those unable to approach the judiciary.
However, Mehta argued that this liberal approach has since been widely misused, with individuals and organisations unconnected to the issues filing PILs for personal, political or ideological reasons. Given the significant improvement in access to justice over the years, he urged the court to enforce stricter standards of locus standi, particularly in cases involving religion, customs, faith and belief systems.
The Centre supported this position, arguing that the definition of locus standi should not be applied liberally in such sensitive matters. The bench appeared inclined towards this view. Chief Justice Kant noted that in recent years, constitutional courts have become increasingly cautious in entertaining PILs, recognising that many petitions are filed with hidden motives or to advance specific agendas. “In the last few years, courts have started enforcing stricter locus standi rules in PILs,” the CJI observed, adding that constitutional courts are now far more circumspect in admitting such petitions. The hearing in the matter will continue on Thursday.
