Putting the Indus Waters Treaty ‘in abeyance’ marks a striking departure from decades of measured diplomacy that Bharat was accustomed to. Long celebrated as a rare beacon of cooperation between Bharat and Pakistan, the pause to treaty is not merely a reaction to the recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam, it signals a profound recalibration of Bharat’s strategic calculus on the Indus Basin.
But the ripple effects are not just diplomatic—they’re deeply local. For decades, the people of Jammu and Kashmir have lived with the paradox of abundant rivers but limited benefit. Under the treaty’s provisions albeit with tight restrictions, Bharat’s ability to develop major hydropower and irrigation projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) in Kashmir has been constrained, often to the frustration of local communities. Now, with the treaty in abeyance, long-stalled water infrastructure projects may finally move forward. This could unlock much-needed development—bringing energy, jobs, and agricultural resilience to J&K, long deprived of its own natural wealth. For many in Kashmir, this policy turn may feel less like brinkmanship and more like long-overdue empowerment.
The Suspension of Treaty
At the heart of this shift is Article III (1) of the treaty, which obliges Bharat to allow the western rivers to flow uninterrupted into Pakistan. For over six decades, Bharat meticulously honoured this clause, upholding not just the letter but the spirit of the agreement. By placing the treaty in abeyance, Bharat has dismantled a cornerstone of postcolonial water diplomacy, signalling that legal fidelity cannot be divorced from national security considerations.
The treaty’s future grew uncertain after the 2016 Uri attack, with Bharat’s recent move marking a logical culmination of this erosion. This is not mere retaliation but a deliberate act of statecraft. Bharat perceives that Pakistan has weaponised treaty mechanisms—using arbitration and Neutral Expert reviews—to obstruct Bharat’s rightful development projects, delaying progress for decades.
Bharat has anchored its action on a principle of customary international law, ‘an undue burden on one of the parties as a result of a fundamental change of circumstances’ as stated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. Though Bharat has not signed the convention and Pakistan has not ratified the convention, the principle is recognised internationally. Bharat’s April 24, 2025 communication to place the IWT in abeyance is a sovereign pause, not a legal withdrawal. The treaty remains technically intact but is functionally suspended.
This move followed Bharat’s invocation of Article XII (3) on August 30, 2024, formally proposing treaty modifications after urging Pakistan in January 2023 to revisit the outdated framework. Since then, institutional mechanisms like the Permanent Indus Commission have stalled. Bharat’s recalibration challenges the notion that treaties are immutable, emphasising that cooperation must be reciprocal and grounded in mutual accountability. Durable peace cannot rest on unilateral restraint.
Optimising the Treaty
With the treaty in abeyance, Bharat gains strategic latitude to optimise its rights, integrating sovereignty, sustainability, security, and regional development. Pakistan’s long-standing use of treaty mechanisms to delay Bharat’s projects has limited Bharat’s storage capacity in Jammu and Kashmir to a negligible 0.797 million acre-feet (MAF), marginally rising to 0.898 MAF with the upcoming Pakal Dul project, despite an entitlement to store 3.6 MAF. Bharat’s hydroelectric projects on the western rivers have so far been limited to run-of-the-river schemes, which do not threaten downstream flows. A new capacity of Bharat with projects like Bursar and Gyspa dams will allow it to fine-tune seasonal flows, potentially disrupting agricultural cycles of Pakistan—a potent, non-military form of leverage. However, Bharat also faces internal constraints such as environmental clearances, local resistance, and fiscal pressures; for example, the Gyspa dam has met strong opposition from Himachali communities. From Delhi’s perspective, placing the treaty in abeyance is less about retaliation and more about reclaiming rights long underutilised. Of the 11,406 MW hydropower potential on the western rivers, Bharat has realised only about 3,034 MW—a missed opportunity and forfeited advantage. Projects like Tulbul should now be prioritised. Meanwhile, Bharat’s projects on eastern rivers, such as Shahpurkandi barrage and Ujh dam, already achieve 90–92 per cent utilisation, reshaping water control dynamics favourably for Bharat.
Accelerating the construction of dams, irrigation, and hydropower in J&K is now a strategic imperative—moving from reactive diplomacy to proactive development. The revival of the Tulbul navigation project, frozen since 1986, could signal governance resolve and commitment to the region. For Kashmiris, the treaty has felt like a ceiling, not a bridge; restarting Tulbul could restore trust and unlock long-denied economic dividends. With the treaty effectively paused, Bharat can study and examine inter-basin water transfers—redirecting surplus flows from J&K to water-stressed states like Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan. This would help address growing hydrological imbalances exacerbated by climate change’s impact on rainfall patterns. Such strategic water redirection is increasingly urgent. So we must ask: Can a treaty drafted in the mid-20th century continue to meet the challenges of the 21st? How should a rising power reconcile its commitments with geopolitical realities? These are not just questions of international norms—they are questions of legacy. The IWT lacks an exit clause. Its future hinges not on legal text but on political will. Will Pakistan feel the heat? Not in the immediate. But that could change. Indus Basin supplies about 80 per cent of Pakistan’s irrigated agriculture, a sector worth roughly 25 per cent of GDP and employing 65 per cent of the labour force. Millions of people rely on the rivers’ waters for their livelihood and survival. Pakistan’s water woes aren’t just infrastructural—they’re governance failures. Even with major dams like Tarbela and Mangla, inefficiencies, poor irrigation practices, and institutional drift leave Pakistan exposed. And in a future where upstream unpredictability becomes the new normal, that exposure could become existential.
Finally, Bharat must reflect strategically. It is an upper riparian on the Indus, but a lower riparian on the Brahmaputra. China’s dam-building near the Great Bend demands a measured yet urgent Bharatiya response—through projects like Dibang and Lower Subansiri in Arunachal Pradesh. Bharat’s water diplomacy must be consistent: assertive where it must be, prudent where it should be.
Towards a Renegotiated Treaty
When the Indus Waters Treaty is renegotiated, two key areas require urgent attention:
- Grievance Redressal: Currently, Article IX establishes a three-step dispute resolution process—the Indus Commissioners, a Neutral Expert appointed by the World Bank, and ultimately, the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague. While seemingly reasonable, Pakistan has repeatedly exploited this framework to delay Bharat’s projects—the Salal Dam, Baglihar, Tulbul navigation (stalled since 1987), and Kishanganga project—all suffered from such tactics. Even Bharat’s legal victories were accompanied by restrictions slowing progress.
Bharat insists disputes should be resolved bilaterally without third-party involvement to prevent Pakistan from internationalising the conflict or using endless legal manoeuvres. Historically, Pakistan’s legal-heavy approach to treaty negotiations reflects a strategy to turn technical water-sharing into legal warfare, painting Bharat as the upper-riparian aggressor.
In renegotiations, Bharat must demand safeguards to prevent the politicisation of dispute mechanisms or international forums and ensure fair, efficient bilateral resolution.
- Outdated Technical Provisions on Dam-building: The treaty was drafted in an era with far less advanced dam technology. Since then, innovations have enhanced safety, efficiency, and environmental protections. Bharat should push to modernise the treaty’s technical clauses, allowing it the flexibility to build and manage water infrastructure that meets contemporary standards and addresses growing developmental needs.
In short, Bharat’s agenda in renegotiating the Indus Waters Treaty should focus on ending Pakistan’s abuse of dispute mechanisms and modernising the treaty’s technical clauses to align with today’s realities. Only then can the treaty truly serve interests fairly and sustainably. And this also goes for Pakistan. In sum, Bharat’s suspension of the IWT is not a withdrawal from cooperation but a demand for cooperation on new terms—reciprocal, realistic, and rooted in mutual responsibility. Bharat is not tearing up the treaty; it is reclaiming agency within it. Whether this shift leads to confrontation or catalyses treaty modernisation depends on the political climate. The message of Bharat is clear: unconditional restraint is over. The waters of the Indus may yet flow toward a renewed future, only if Pakistan is prepared to redraw the lines.
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