The Supreme Court on April 16, agreed to hear a Public Interest Litigation challenging provisions of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, while making detailed observations on the limits of judicial intervention and the constitutional boundaries between Parliament and the judiciary.
A Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi issued notice to the Union Ministry of Minority Affairs and sought its response on the plea filed by Poulomi Pavini Shukla and Nyaya Naari Foundation.
At the very outset, the Bench expressed hesitation on the scope of the challenge. Chief Justice Kant observed that the court could not step into legislative territory. “We can neither legislate nor create amendments,” he said, adding that replacing personal laws with the Indian Succession Act could amount to judicial legislation.
The court, however, agreed to proceed after senior advocate Prashant Bhushan argued that the provisions violate the fundamental right to equality under Article 14, particularly in matters of inheritance affecting Muslim women.
Calling the broader debate significant, the Chief Justice remarked that the idea of a Uniform Civil Code is a “constitutional ambition” and added, “it has nothing to do with religion.”
During the hearing, the Bench also questioned the maintainability of the petition in its current form. Chief Justice Kant asked, “Can someone who is not a Muslim file such a petition?” and stressed that “actual sufferers” must be brought on record.
He directed the petitioner side to implead affected women, stating, “You will have to add the affected women as party or intervenors so that it does not appear to be an issue of other persons challenging a faith.”
Justice Bagchi also made important observations on the nature of reform in personal law systems, stating, “It should seem as a reformation from within the faith itself.” He further added, “We have to see if it is within the domain of judiciary to bring in social reform.”
Bhushan argued that the provisions under Shariat law result in clear discrimination. “In the absence of a uniform civil law, around 100 million Muslim women are being discriminated against. Women receive half or even less than what male counterparts receive,” he submitted.
He further added, “This is purely civil in nature. It cannot be treated as an essential religious practice protected under Article 25.”
The Bench, however, raised caution on judicial substitution of legal frameworks. Justice Bagchi observed, “Threshold of reading down is higher since you are asking us to delete something. In some cases we decide the area was empty. Here Shariat law exists.”
Chief Justice Kant also pointed to institutional limits, stating, “That will go into legislating.”
Bhushan responded that the court could read down provisions and allow a neutral succession law to apply. “Once this is struck down, the Indian Succession Act can apply,” he argued.
The Bench, however, remained cautious, noting that such a move would require careful judicial restraint. “Some aggrieved person has to come,” the CJI reiterated, while acknowledging that “public interest element is there.”
Justice Bagchi also noted that even if reform is necessary, it must meet constitutional thresholds. “Even if part of religious practice, it has to be tested under constitutional guarantees,” he observed in response to arguments on equality.
The court ultimately issued notice and posted the matter for further hearing, directing the petitioners to bring “actual sufferers” on record and ensuring that the matter is properly constituted before deeper examination.
The Bench said it would proceed cautiously, balancing constitutional rights, personal laws, and the limits of judicial intervention.
