With Modi 3.0 back in the saddle, now is the propitious moment to build on the transformational edifice laid over the last ten years, take national security to the next level, and complete India’s national security “makeover”.
The makeover must grapple with two major challenges that line our national security path. One, of course, is the deterrence of the Chinese military juggernaut. The other is the strategic, operational and tactical adaptations needed to deal with the humongous changes in the character of war, which, in the view of the recently retired Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, is the “most profound in recorded history”. Both the challenges are monumental—the Chinese challenge in terms of ‘enormity’ and the other in terms of ‘sheer complexity’.
For a long time, the Indian defence ecosystem stood still amid a massive global churn. In recent times, we have begun to react to ongoing change. The mantra for the future must be to anticipate and drive change to define the strategic-military future.
- A prospective roadmap must traverse three domains:
- Reinforcing deficits in territorial combat
- Finessing our strategic deterrence
- Creating capacities in power projection
While the first needs mere reinforcement, the latter two have been our traditional areas of weakness and need priority attention. A reorientation in our strategic outlook, as well as material, structural, and cultural corrections, is essential to ensure that our foreign policy and economic flight are calibrated with the span of our strategic stride.
Five-point roadmap for India’s National Security and strategic deterrence
Here is a five-point roadmap for our collective consideration in the stated context.
First and foremost, we need to re-visit the state of our Air Defences (AD). On the fateful night of 14 April 2024, what protected the Israelis was an elaborate, integrated array of detection, interception and engagement. Sensors from the United States (US) Missile Defense Agency; the Iron Dome; Arrow 2, Arrow 3 and David Slingshot missile systems; Sea-based Aegis; and US and United Kingdom (UK) fighters; as also, most critically, space-based intelligence and interception—all these mechanisms and systems were deployed to disrupt and destroy a 330-projectile, not so strong, Iranian barrage. The Chinese Rocket Force & Strategic Force operating in concert are a far more sophisticated instrument of cutting-edge, lethal, and long-range precision, with shorter flight durations (meaning lesser reaction time) and the ability to strike military deployments, border towns and heartland cities with equal ease and precision. Therefore, a comprehensive review of our Air Defence posture and preparedness is an urgent need.
Second, we may consider structuring an Integrated Drone-Missile Force as an instrument of in-tandem deterrence to the AD upgrade. Such a force may have far greater political utility and the least escalatory of response options. It also does not carry the perils associated with pilot loss and is an instrument of equal leverage in escalatory spirals and high-intensity combat. It is relatively cost-effective and has been used with telling effect in recent conflicts such as Ukraine. This calls for a sharp, conceptual rejig in the employment of our missile arsenal. A clever mix of a variety of one-way, low-cost drones and ballistic, cruise, and potentially hypersonic missiles, launched in concert to ensure synchronised arrival on target, complicates adversary AD response greatly while ensuring the requisite degree of penetration.
In a Pakistan threat contingency, the utility of such an instrument is far greater than our current response framework based on mechanised forces and piloted air strikes. Vis-à-vis China, targeting Chinese military assets in the Western Theatre Command, the Chinese mainland, and the prosperous East Coast will be a powerful deterrent.
Third, data is now a weapon system in the modern toolkit of all advanced militaries. In this domain, the attack surfaces are growing, the margin for error is shrinking, and decision cycles are shortening. We need to invest significantly in the triad of data, algorithms, and computation and manage, secure, and leverage data for superior operational effects. The Defence Services must grow their computing power, unlock their data, and train defence-specific Large Language Models to enable the transformation of the Indian military into an AI-driven combat force. This could also be the secret sauce in our asymmetric address of China.
Fourth, Aatmanirbharta in Defense (AID) has had a splendid takeoff with game-changing reforms. We need to nurse it further with a three-pronged endeavour—major cultural transitions; building capacities in niche, strategic technologies like AI, Autonomy, Biotechnology and Space; and a stockpile upgrade for high-intensity combat. We need to appreciate that capital and personnel investments required in Defence are so long-term and huge that without a clear and consistent demand signal and a firm financial commitment from the Government, business propositions are unlikely to flourish. Private companies will not invest in plants, machinery and production lines unless there is a reasonable guarantee of orders. We need to set aside the tyranny of L-1 (the lowest bidder winning a contract), overcome the ring-fencing of mediocrity, and embrace a culture of talent identification/enablement /maximisation, i.e., create “National Champions in Defence”.
We need to identify talented MSMEs, startups, and private companies and help them grow to meet domestic Defence needs so that such entities can survive and thrive in the international competition for defence equipment. Major defence corporations worldwide (from China’s NORINCO to South Korea’s Korean Aerospace Industries Limited) have received active handholding/propping up from their respective Governments. So, there are billion-dollar defence startups like the US-based Anduril (advanced military autonomous systems) and Europe–based Helsing (Defence AI). India needs to create its own Defence Majors that are globally competitive.
The long-term aspiration of AID must be to grow India into a defence powerhouse of consequence, both in terms of revenue generation and geostrategic heft. If seven out of the top 20 defence companies in the world are Chinese, should India not aspire to be in the same league?
Five, we may also consider building capacities in power projection, not to create a military that jackboots around the world but one that is able to intervene at progressively increasing distances from the mainland when our interests so necessitate. Long-range stealth, projecting power across the Malacca Strait, and a dramatic upgradation of capacities in the commons (space and cyber) are some of the facets that merit close attention.
An agile, fleet-footed military, no longer burdened by a defensive crouch, is the need of the hour to embellish India’s aspirations and secure the trajectory of its inevitable rise.
