Washington has recovered sufficiently from the initial shock of being told that the Indo-US nuclear deal is virtually off, and with it the prospects of multi-billion dollar sales of nuclear reactors and heavy water fuel, to exert strong pressure on the Indian government. In an article titled ?America'sStrategic Opportunity with India: The New US-India Partnership? in Foreign Affairs (November-December 2007), Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, insists that India complete formalities with the IAEA and NSG by November-end so the Congress can approve the deal by Christmas.
The BJP, which once considered a no-confidence motion on the nuclear deal, and the Left parties, which hold the UPA government in the palm of their hands, and Third Front parties of the UNPA, not to mention UPA allies who do not favour the deal, must now keep a close watch on developments in New Delhi to thwart a quick covert operation at the behest of Uncle Sam. As the majority of parties in Parliament clearly oppose the deal, preliminary consultations on a coordinated no-confidence motion are in order because despite Dr. Manmohan Singh and Ms. Sonia Gandhi hinting the deal was off at the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit, the subsequent flip-flop by central ministers suggests the government may still try to push it through.
The US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs is candid that Washington wants New Delhi to play a key role in furthering its global interests amidst growing anti-Americanism worldwide. The principal carrot offered is, of course, the war on terror, but covers combating international drug and criminal cartels, trafficking in women and children, and climate change.
President Bush decided to place a strategic bet on India on coming to power, and specifically tackled the non-proliferation issue by calling for cooperation in four strategic areas, viz., civil nuclear energy, civilian space programme, high-tech commerce, and missile defence. Mr. Burns claims that when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited India in March 2005, she offered to ?de-hyphenate? the American policy of balancing ?India-Pakistan? by pursuing an independent relationship with both India and Pakistan, and breaking the non-proliferation orthodoxy by establishing full civil nuclear cooperation with an energy-starved India.
What Mr. Burns does not say, of course, is that America only re-worked the language of its diplomacy in the region, and actually intensified its relationship with Islamabad by making Pakistan a major non-NATO ally. That this has not furthered the war on terror in Afghanistan or even Pakistan is, however, another matter. Pakistan still remains Washington'smost trusted ally, to the extent that it allowed Gen. Musharraf to deport former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif when he returned home to fight the elections, and brokered a deal for the return of the stridently anti-India Ms. Benazir Bhutto. The attempt on Ms. Bhutto'slife so early in her return journey, however, shows that like most of America's?deals,? this one too is half-stitched.
Sensing Dr. Manmohan Singh'sweakness, however, President Bush is determined to bring India into the non-proliferation regime, directly or indirectly. Having worked on the deal since Dr. Singh'sWashington visit in July 2005, Mr. Bush and the US nuclear industry are unwilling to let go of the opportunity to ?help? India construct new power plants and sell latest nuclear fuel and technology. Indeed, the December 2006 Hyde Act was passed by the US Congress to facilitate American investment in India'scivil nuclear power industry. The US Atomic Energy Act required a legal basis for bilateral nuclear collaboration, and hence the ?123 agreement? was made in July 2007.
These agreements were made to benefit the United States. Mr. Burns is categorical that under the deal, India would submit its entire civil nuclear programme to international inspection by permanently placing 14 of 22 nuclear power plants and all future civil reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. In one generation, 90 per cent of India'sreactors would be covered by agreement and India ?brought into the international nuclear non-proliferation mainstream.? There is no room for ambiguity in this assertion, hence the danger of this ill-conceived Indo-US civil nuclear deal being operationalised is alive.
It bears stating that the decision to grant India the right to reprocess spent fuel was no big deal, and Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community already enjoy such a facility. Besides, as Mr. Burns points out, this right is operational only after India builds a state-of-the-art reprocessing facility fully monitored by the IAEA and US agrees to the specific arrangements and procedures for it. The UPA has not informed the Indian public about this condition. Moreover, in the event of India conducting a nuclear test, Washington retains the right under US law to seek return of all nuclear fuel and technology from US firms. Clearly this is a one-way deal, serving only American corporate interests.
Another objectionable objective is to corner India-friendly nations like Iran. It is evident that what America really seeks is to out-source some of its pressing needs to India, particularly in the fields of military and intelligence, agriculture and education, energy and environment, and freedom and democracy (read: attacking target nations like Myanmar and Nepal, but not Pakistan). Washington particularly wants the Indian Navy to protect the sea-lanes between the Middle East, Africa and East Asia. It is also keen to sell equipment to the Indian Army.
As in the past, there is really no convergence of interests between India and the US, and any kind of partnership can only be on an issue-to-issue basis. As in the post-World War II era, American imperialism, its undying thirst for economic and strategic advantage at any cost, constitutes the gravest threat to global security and peace.
