New Delhi: Turkish media is increasingly drawing India into the rapidly worsening strategic rivalry between Israel and Turkey, despite New Delhi having no direct role in the confrontation. A recent Turkish media presentation placing Prime Minister Narendra Modi alongside Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli leadership illustrates how India is being portrayed as part of a wider geopolitical contest centred on the West Asia, particularly post-Assad Syria.
The narrative has emerged as Israel-Turkey tensions have intensified following Israel’s August 18 airstrikes on Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase near Aleppo. Israel said the strikes were intended to prevent a possible Turkish military deployment at the facility, while Ankara rejected the allegation and condemned the Israeli action. Reuters reported that eight Israeli strikes hit the airbase, with the United States subsequently pushing for a deconfliction mechanism involving Israel, Turkey and Syria to prevent further escalation.
Against this backdrop, sections of Turkish media are increasingly presenting India’s expanding relationships with Israel, Greece, Cyprus and the United Arab Emirates as components of a wider strategic alignment that could constrain Ankara.
India drawn into a rivalry centred on Syria
The attempt to place India inside the Israel-Turkey confrontation is significant because the immediate dispute is fundamentally rooted in developments in Syria. Turkey has emerged as an important player in post-Assad Syria and has strengthened its relationship with the country’s new political leadership under President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Israel, meanwhile, is seeking to prevent military developments in Syria that it considers a potential threat to its security.
The August 18 strike dramatically exposed the growing friction. Israel argued that a possible Turkish deployment at Abu al-Duhur represented a security concern, while Turkey denied that it was preparing such a deployment. Washington has since sought to establish communication and deconfliction arrangements between the three countries.
The wider strategic picture helps explain Ankara’s sensitivity. Brookings has described the Israel-Turkey rivalry as a structural constraint affecting Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean and other regional theatres. It has also noted the tightening Israel-Greece-Cyprus relationship around Turkey.
⚠️ 🇹🇷 OFICINA DEL PRIMER MINISTRO:
“Turquía avanzó para ampliar su presencia militar en Siria hacia la frontera con Israel. Israel detectó la amenaza y actuó antes de que escalara.”Mirá el mapa. Mirá lo que ocurrió. pic.twitter.com/Aa5aHTl3Rj
— Doron (@plexaleOK) August 21, 2026
A July 8 analysis published by the Greek-Australian outlet Ta Nea went further, describing an emerging Greece-Israel-India-UAE-Cyprus strategic alignment as a potential long-term challenge for Turkey. The article acknowledged that this is not a formal military alliance but argued that increasingly interconnected defence, security, economic and energy partnerships could reshape the regional balance.
This distinction is crucial. India’s defence cooperation with Israel is substantial, while New Delhi has also expanded defence and diplomatic engagement with Greece. Yet bilateral partnerships do not automatically constitute an anti-Turkey military coalition.
India’s foreign policy continues to be driven by strategic autonomy and issue-based partnerships. New Delhi maintains extensive relations with Israel while simultaneously engaging Arab countries, Iran, Europe, Russia, the United States and other major powers. Its defence relationships are principally shaped by national security requirements, access to advanced technology, maritime interests and broader geopolitical objectives.
Strategic autonomy, not an anti-Turkey bloc
There is little evidence that India intends to enter an Israel-Turkey confrontation. New Delhi has no obvious strategic incentive to become directly involved in a military contest in the Eastern Mediterranean or Syria. India’s immediate priorities include protecting its interests in the Indian Ocean, strengthening defence capabilities, securing energy supplies, maintaining critical trade routes and expanding partnerships with major global powers.
The Turkish narrative therefore risks turning independent Indian foreign-policy decisions into evidence of a coordinated strategic campaign against Ankara.
Turkey’s concern, however, is not entirely without strategic logic. From Ankara’s perspective, stronger India-Israel and India-Greece relations become more consequential when viewed alongside the growing Israel-Greece-Cyprus partnership and the UAE’s regional role. Together, these relationships may appear to Turkey as part of a broader network capable of reducing its strategic room for manoeuvre.
But perception is different from an established military alignment. India’s engagement with Israel and Greece serves Indian interests. New Delhi has also consistently avoided becoming formally tied to military blocs. Even where strategic partnerships deepen, India generally retains freedom of action rather than accepting obligations to participate in another country’s regional confrontation.
That makes the Turkish media portrayal of Prime Minister Narendra Modi alongside Erdogan and Israeli leaders more revealing of Ankara’s strategic anxieties than of India’s actual intentions.
The larger issue is the changing geopolitical architecture around Turkey. Ankara increasingly sees Israel, Greece and Cyprus developing closer defence cooperation, while the UAE adds another important regional relationship. India’s growing economic, technological, diplomatic and defence weight gives this network an additional Indo-Pacific dimension. Ta Nea explicitly linked these partnerships across the Eastern Mediterranean, Gulf and Indo-Pacific.
For India, however, the most rational course remains clear that deepen bilateral partnerships wherever they advance national interests while avoiding unnecessary entanglement in conflicts that do not directly concern New Delhi.
The Israel-Turkey confrontation is likely to remain focused on Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean and the competing regional ambitions of Ankara and Jerusalem. Washington’s current effort to establish a deconfliction mechanism underscores the seriousness of the risk.
India therefore need not choose sides in this rivalry. Its strategic autonomy allows New Delhi to maintain strong relations with Israel and Greece without accepting the premise that those partnerships amount to participation in an anti-Turkey coalition.
If Turkish media continues to frame India as part of a regional campaign against Ankara, the distinction between partnership and alliance will become increasingly important. India’s growing global partnerships are designed to expand its strategic options, not to inherit another country’s geopolitical confrontation.
