As per the analysis of Delhi Defence Review, the concerns have been made public regarding a potential new threat on the Sino-Pak Axis, G,811 Kms with India (3488 with China1 and 3323 with Pakistan2), suggesting that China and Pakistan may be developing high-altitude swarm drones designed to outmanoeuvre India’s multi-layered air defence system. Review highlights that these drones, capable of flying at an altitude of 5,000 – 10,000 feet, higher than the reach of conventional anti-aircraft guns like the ZSU-23-4 Shilka, L70 and Zu-23mm cannons, aiming to exhaust India’s air defence missile stockpiles before launching cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. This evolving tactic underscores the growing vagaries of aerial threats facing India.
Recently, a report3 suggests that China might be in the process of supplying swarm drone technology or know-how to Pakistan4 through the back channel,5 potentially tailored for high–altitude operations. Such drones could be equipped with lightweight payloads for reconnaissance, electronic warfare or even kamikaze–style attacks, curated to saturate Indian air defences. By operating at higher altitudes, these drones would exploit gaps in India’s current air defence network, particularly in regions like Jammu and Kashmir and along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where low–altitude threats have historically been prioritised.
In May, Operation Sindoor drew an apparent picture of India’s air defence architecture’s reliance on a layered approach. Combining guns, short–range missiles and long–range systems like the S–400 with the L70 and Shilka (Schilka) guns providing point defence against low–flying threats, while the systems like AKASH(25 km range) and MRSAM (70 – 100 Km range) to address mid-to-long-range threats. The Akashteer command and control network, which proved highly effective by neutralising Pakistani drones and missiles, integrated these systems for real–time threat response. However, high-altitude swarm drones could challenge this framework by forcing over-reliance on missile-based systems, which are costlier and finite in supply.
Depleting missile stockpiles through swarm drone attacks could create windows of vulnerability, allowing adversaries to deploy cruise missiles (e.g., Pakistan’s Babur or China’s CJ–10) or ballistic missiles (Pakistan’s Shaheen series or China’s DF–21) with reduced risk of interception. This tactic aligns with China’s broader doctrine of “systems destruction warfare”, which seeks to dismantle an opponent’s command, control, and defence infrastructure through coordinated, multi–domain attacks. T
The war in Ukraine has provided a playbook for drone warfare to the rest of the world, demonstrating both the tactical value of and strategic implications of widespread drone deployment – lessons that India’s neighbours appear to be internalising with increasing urgency. The question remains, are we still turning the pages, or are we ready to write our own?
