There are reports of Houthi terrorists getting close to downing the US manufactured F-35, a fifth-generation latest strike aircraft, on March 15 this year. This news obviously was suppressed by the US.
It was also reported that several American F-16 Viper fighter aircraft also had to face the rudimentary air defence capabilities of the Houthis in Yemen. The US had launched Operation Rough Rider to strike against Houthi targets in Yemen in March this year. Houthis are a terrorist organisation based in Yemen, which is fighting the Saudi and the US-supported regime in Yemen. The situation in Yemen remains fragile with reports of regular conflict between the Government forces and Houthis.
The air defence capability of Houthis has surprised the Americans and other military analysts alike. Houthis are known to possess mobile air defence systems, which can appear anywhere and disrupt the air missions. Houthis are using improvised passive infrared sensors and elementary air-to-air missiles which seem to threaten even advanced fighter aircraft like the F-35. Since Pakistan has close links with the Jihadi elements, it is feasible for them to source similar air defence capability from terrorist organisations like Houthis.
It has come to light that Houthis are using mobile, low-tech systems like repurposed infrared guided missiles like Thaqib -1 or 2, Saqr – 358 and radar guided SA-6 systems, which are able to detect and counter due to their high mobility and passive sensors. It is feasible that Pakistan could deploy similar cost effective, mobile air defence systems (Chinese HQ-9 or Pakistan’s LY-80), both on the LOC and the IB.
Houthi reliance on passive infrared sensors for detection and targeting has been able to bypass detection, posing a potential threat to stealth and non-stealth aircraft alike.
It is appreciated that Houthi IR based systems could detect an advanced aircraft like F-35 especially when weapon bays open, increasing radar cross-section. This certainly calls for serious countermeasures for those few seconds required for opening weapon bays in own fighter aircraft. This also underscores the need for Integrated IRCM and electronic warfare systems to protect against low-tech but effective air defence. Another advantage of these low-tech and relatively cheap systems is availability in mass numbers, which can cause sufficient attrition to our air defence resources.
Another lesson for us lies in the drone warfare domain. Houthis displayed an uncanny ability to destroy US MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in significant numbers with their IR-guided missiles.
Iran’s support for Houthi warfighting abilities provides a blueprint for asymmetric air defence strategies, which our adversaries may replicate. Pakistan, with its Jihadi connection, may acquire similar low-cost, high-impact systems. The global war against terrorism may have to counter more and more conventional threats from missiles and IR systems held with the terrorists. In addition, strategic and tactical intelligence has to match the designs of terror organisations.
