NUCLEAR tests carried out by India and Pakistan in May 1998 irked many developed nations who feared a nuclear arms race in the region. Optimistic observers, however, agreed that nuclearisation would stabilise South Asia by making a future Indo-Pakistan conflict prohibitively expensive, while pessimists feared that given their past record of bitter historical rivalry, nuclear proliferation would make the subcontinent more dangerous. This book analyses and provides answers to the above-mentioned issue and its implications for the world.
The current analyses of nuclear proliferation’s likely impact are based largely on arguments drawn from the Cold War history and stress the fact that whatever holds true for the South Asian region would apply to other developing countries, like Iran and North Korea too. Assessment is made of the effect of nuclear weapons on the South Asian security environment during three time periods – South Asia’s nuclear past between late 1980s through 2002; the present from 2002 and through 2007; and from 2008 onwards. For the first two time-periods, the book tries to determine the impact that nuclear weapons had on Indo-Pakistan relations and the strategic environment in the subcontinent. For the future it speculates as to how proliferation-related development may affect the South Asian strategic environment in the years to come.
After giving the introduction, the second chapter presents the historical and theoretical background behind the current debate over South Asian nuclear proliferation. Tracing the origins of the Indo-Pakistan conflict, it outlines the history of the South Asian proliferation process and locates disagreements within the policy over nuclear weapons’ effects over the region.
The book offers competing theoretical frameworks for understanding nuclear weapons’ effects on Indo-Pakistan conflict and on the behaviour of new nuclear powers generally. It is on this subject that both Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur develop their arguments.
Both Ganguly and Kapur conceptualise their competitive arguments as well as the standard nuclear optimistic and pessimistic claims as part of the outcome-and process-based approaches to nuclear proliferation. Secondly, both speak against the potential introduction of ballistic missile deterrence capabilities into South Asia. In their view BMDs could probably encourage an arms race and even create first-strike incentives. Finally, both argue that nuclear weapons will be of little use in solving South Asia’s most pressing problems like security.
No amount of nuclear weapons can eradicate this problem. Pakistan has to realise that the cost of supporting military warfare far outweigh its benefits while India has to resolve tension within Kashmir, address the legitimate grievances of its Muslim population and take internal security matters far more seriously.
The subject is topical and written well.
(Penguin India Books Pvt Ltd, 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi-110 017)
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