The relationship between India and China in 2025 represents one of the most consequential yet complex bilateral dynamics in contemporary geopolitics. Their interactions carry profound implications for regional stability and broader global order. The current phase of their relationship is characterised by cautious diplomatic engagement alongside persistent structural tensions. It reflects both the pragmatic necessities of coexistence and the deep-rooted challenges that continue to define this critical partnership. The Indo-Sino relations are unequivocally asymmetrical. While India aims to shun the old equations, China, on the other hand, is playing hardball to contain the new India.
The Kazan Reset: A Diplomatic Watershed
The trajectory of contemporary India-China relations can be traced to a pivotal moment in October 2024, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. This was their first meeting in five years, a period marked by military standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which was ‘resolved’ just days ahead of the summit by finalising a new arrangement for border patrols. This carefully choreographed diplomatic reset marked the beginning of what analysts have termed a “pragmatic turn” in bilateral relations.
The Kazan meeting was significant not merely for its symbolism but for the methodical groundwork that preceded it. The resolution of the immediate border patrol arrangements just days before the leaders’ summit demonstrated both sides’ commitment to creating conditions conducive to high-level dialogue. This pattern of tactical accommodation has since become a defining feature of the relationship, with both nations showing a willingness to compartmentalise immediate disputes in the service of broader strategic objectives.
Institutional Engagement and Diplomatic Momentum
Following the Kazan reset, both nations have engaged in sustained institutional dialogue across multiple levels. India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, travelled to Beijing in December 2024 to participate in the India-China Special Representatives’ (SR) talks with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. This was followed by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s visit to Beijing in January 2025, which yielded concrete agreements on practical cooperation, including the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage, sharing of hydrological data, and the restoration of direct air services.
The symbolic dimension of this diplomatic engagement has been equally important. Both countries observed the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties on April 1, 2025, and exchanged congratulatory messages. President Xi used the emblematic metaphor “Dragon-Elephant tango” to symbolise the improving relations. This carefully chosen metaphor suggests not merely coexistence but a coordinated dance between two powerful entities—a vision that requires both partners to move in harmony despite their considerable size and strength.
The reciprocal nature of these engagements has been noteworthy. China’s Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong’s visit to India in June 2025 demonstrated Beijing’s commitment to maintaining diplomatic momentum. The frequency and level of these exchanges mark a significant departure from the diplomatic freeze that characterised the relationship during the peak of border tensions.
Economic Pragmatism Amid Strategic Competition
The economic dimension of India-China relations reveals the complex interplay between pragmatic cooperation and strategic competition that defines the broader relationship. China remains India’s largest trading partner, yet it is marked by a significant trade deficit for the latter, approaching $100 billion. This economic reality underscores the fundamental asymmetry in the relationship while highlighting the interdependence that both nations cannot easily escape.
India’s approach to Chinese investment and technology transfer reflects this pragmatic calculus. India’s relaxation of investment rules and the streamlining of short-term visas for Chinese technicians in 2024 reflect a pragmatic attempt to balance security concerns with underlying economic realities. This policy adjustment demonstrates New Delhi’s recognition that complete economic decoupling from China would be both impractical and potentially damaging to India’s own development objectives.
However, the economic relationship remains structurally imbalanced. China continues to be a major source of India’s industrial imports, particularly electronics, machinery, and intermediate goods, while Indian exports face non-tariff barriers that restrict even competitive goods from entering the Chinese market. This asymmetry perpetuates India’s dependence on Chinese manufacturing while limiting its ability to capitalise on its own competitive advantages in services and select manufacturing sectors.
Contrasting Picture of 2025 SCO Summit Setback: Institutional Warfare
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s 2025 meetings revealed the extent to which bilateral tensions between India and China now affect multilateral frameworks. Beijing’s bid for enhanced regional leadership suffered a setback Thursday when India rejected signing a joint statement put before members of the China-backed Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, saying it was pro-Pakistan in not mentioning April’s terror attack on Indian territory.
Defence ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in China were unable to adopt a joint statement at the end of their talks due to a lack of consensus on referring to “terrorism”, the Indian foreign ministry said on Thursday. This failure represents more than a diplomatic disagreement—it signals the breakdown of China’s ability to use multilateral institutions to legitimise its regional agenda.
The specific nature of India’s objection reveals the deeper dynamics at play. India’s Defence Minister refused to sign the SCO joint declaration because it omitted any reference to the April terrorist attack in India’s Pahalgam while choosing to include a mention of Pakistan’s Baluchistan, which New Delhi interpreted as a veiled accusation echoing Islamabad’s line. This selective approach to addressing terrorism—ignoring attacks on India while highlighting Pakistani grievances—exposed China’s partisan approach to multilateral diplomacy.
The implications of this setback extend far beyond the SCO. It demonstrates that India is no longer willing to subordinate its interests to institutional unity when such unity comes at the cost of legitimising anti-India narratives. This represents a fundamental shift in India’s approach to China-led multilateral frameworks, suggesting that New Delhi is prepared to challenge Beijing’s institutional leadership even at the cost of appearing disruptive.
The Pakistan Factor: A Persistent Complication
The triangular dynamics involving Pakistan continue to represent one of the most significant structural obstacles to India-China normalisation. China’s relationship with Pakistan, often described as an “all-weather partnership,” creates inherent tensions with India’s security interests. China is already a major supplier of military hardware to Pakistan, including missiles, fighter jets, submarines, and surveillance equipment. A SIPRI report in March 2025 notes that China is the source of nearly 81 per cent of Pakistan’s arms imports in the last five years.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor remains a particular source of concern for India, as it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. China-led multi-billion-dollar projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is now set to be extended to Afghanistan. This expansion of Chinese infrastructure investments in territories that India considers occupied represents a direct challenge to India’s territorial claims and sovereignty.
More concerning from India’s perspective is China’s apparent effort to institutionalise regional arrangements that exclude India. China’s hosting of the first-ever trilateral meeting with Pakistan and Bangladesh in June signals its clear intent to institutionalise regional groupings that exclude India, capitalising on the decade-long vacuum in South Asian economic integration created by India-Pakistan hostility. This strategy suggests a deliberate Chinese effort to limit India’s regional influence while expanding its own.
The Trilateral Architecture: China’s New Strategic Weapon
Last week, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh held their first trilateral meeting in Kunming, China. The discussions focused on furthering cooperation and exploring the possibilities of deeper engagement. This meeting, held on June 19, 2025, was not an isolated diplomatic event but rather the culmination of a carefully orchestrated Chinese strategy to create institutional frameworks that exclude and marginalise India in its own neighbourhood.
The trilateral mechanism represents a fundamental departure from traditional bilateral engagement patterns in South Asia. The meeting officially launched a structured trilateral cooperation mechanism. The three sides agreed to advance trilateral cooperation based on the principles of good-neighbourliness, equality, mutual trust, openness, inclusiveness, common development, and win-win cooperation. However, beneath this diplomatic veneer lies a more sinister objective: to create an alternative power structure in South Asia that systematically undermines India’s natural leadership role in the region.
This meeting closely follows another trilateral meeting between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, held in May, with the aim of extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and increasing cooperation. The sequential nature of these trilateral arrangements reveals Beijing’s methodical approach to regional realignment. By creating overlapping triangular partnerships with different South Asian nations, China is constructing a web of relationships that collectively serve to contain Indian influence while expanding its own strategic footprint.
The timing of China’s trilateral initiatives coincides with significant political transitions in the region. Before their respective regime changes in 2021 and 2024, both countries were staunch supporters of India’s fight against both Pakistan and its state-sponsored terrorism. With the change in regimes, however, Pakistan and China have attempted to draw both countries closer to their orbit.
The challenge for China lies in the inherent instability of relationships built on regime changes rather than enduring national interests. Historically, both Bangladesh and Afghanistan have enjoyed close ties with Pakistan and provide a fertile ground for cross-border terrorism. However, leveraging these relationships for strategic advantage requires sustained political control that may not be sustainable in the long term.
Moreover, Pakistan’s influence, supported by China and its economic clout, could thus create new terror and security-related challenges. This will help Pakistan become a relevant country in the region, create rifts between India and its neighbours, and keep Delhi preoccupied with immediate security and terror-related challenges. While this strategy may create short-term complications for India, it also risks associating China with regional instability and terrorism, potentially undermining its broader diplomatic objectives.
Strategic Autonomy vs. Alliance Pressures
India’s foreign policy establishment faces increasingly complex choices as it seeks to balance its traditional strategic autonomy with the pressures of great power competition. India also remains part of groupings often viewed as “anti-China,” the Quad in particular, which also includes the US, Australia, and Japan. The Quad’s evolution from a diplomatic forum to a more substantive security arrangement creates tension with India’s efforts to normalise relations with China.
The challenge for India lies in maintaining its strategic autonomy while participating in security arrangements that China views as containment mechanisms. Stable China‑India relations reduce India’s strategic reliance on the US and make New Delhi less inclined to be a “bulwark” against China. This dynamic suggests that improved India-China relations could have significant implications for the broader Indo-Pacific strategic balance.
Multilateral Diplomacy and Global South Leadership
Both India and China have found common ground in their shared leadership roles within Global South institutions. India and China happen to find common ground in the Global South through a number of multilateral platforms such as BRICS, the SCO, and the G20, which are positioned as counterweights to the largely Western-led international order. This convergence of interests in multilateral forums provides a framework for cooperation that transcends bilateral tensions.
However, even within these multilateral contexts, bilateral tensions occasionally surface. The recent SCO ministerial meetings highlighted how third-party considerations can complicate even routine multilateral cooperation. The Indian Defence Minister refused to sign the SCO joint declaration because it omitted any reference to the April terrorist attack in India’s Pahalgam, while choosing to include a mention of Pakistan’s Baluchistan. Such incidents demonstrate how bilateral tensions can spill over into multilateral settings.
Xi Jinping’s BRICS Absence: A Diplomatic Earthquake
Perhaps the most striking development in recent India-China relations has been Xi Jinping’s unprecedented decision to skip the BRICS summit in Brazil. President Xi Jinping will miss a meeting of BRICS leaders in Rio de Janeiro, according to a Brazilian official familiar with the matter, marking the first time the Chinese leader has skipped the summit since taking power.
This is the first time that President Xi will miss a BRICS summit since 2013, when he came to power, making this absence historically significant. The official explanation cites scheduling conflicts, but according to officials familiar with the matter, Beijing told the Brazilian government that Xi had a scheduling conflict, while other sources suggest more complex motivations.
The most revealing aspect of this absence may be its connection to India’s rising profile within BRICS. China cites a scheduling conflict, but reports suggest Beijing was unhappy with Brazil hosting a state dinner for India’s Modi, which could have made Xi appear like a “supporting actor”. Some speculate that Xi skipped the event because Lula invited Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to a state dinner after the summit, which may have made Xi feel like a “supporting actor”.
This explanation, if accurate, reveals a profound shift in the dynamics of global South leadership. The fact that China’s leader would avoid a summit he has attended without fail for over a decade suggests that Beijing perceives India’s growing influence within BRICS as a direct challenge to its own leadership aspirations. The symbolism of Modi receiving a state dinner while Xi would have been merely another participant appears to have been unacceptable to the Chinese leadership.
The broader implications of Xi’s absence are significant. BRICS was conceived partly as a China-led alternative to Western-dominated institutions, and Xi’s personal participation has been crucial to maintaining China’s leadership within the bloc. His absence creates space for other leaders, particularly Modi, to assert greater influence over the organisation’s direction and priorities.
Future Trajectory: Cautious Optimism with Structural Constraints
The current trajectory of India-China relations suggests cautious optimism tempered by structural constraints. As India and China navigate their complex relationship in 2025, their rivalry will remain the dominant feature of their interactions. It is not easy for India to trust China, but at the same time, New Delhi needs to maintain cordial relations with Beijing to protect its economic interests.
The fundamental challenge lies in managing strategic competition while maintaining functional cooperation. Relations between India and China seem to be thawing since they reached a border agreement in late 2024. However, economic and security concerns suggest this might not continue without a more sustained dialogue. This assessment captures the precarious nature of the current improvement—significant progress has been made, but it requires constant nurturing to prevent regression.
Implications for Global Order
The evolution of India-China relations carries implications far beyond bilateral ties. Despite their rise having important consequences for the future of global governance, China–India relations are poorly understood outside of those countries. As the world’s two most populous nations and among its fastest-growing major economies, their relationship will significantly influence the emerging multipolar order.
The ability of India and China to manage their differences while cooperating on global challenges will be crucial for addressing issues ranging from climate change to global economic governance. Their joint leadership in institutions like BRICS and their shared commitment to reforming the international financial architecture suggest potential for constructive cooperation despite bilateral tensions.
The Limits of Chinese Power
The developments of 2025 have revealed several critical limitations in China’s regional strategy. First, the developments in the region demonstrate, once again, that China, and not Pakistan, is India’s biggest challenge. With both Pakistan and China confronting a confident India, China sees an opportunity to challenge India through the trilateral nexus. However, India’s willingness to confront these challenges directly has limited the effectiveness of this approach.
Second, China’s ability to use multilateral institutions to advance its agenda has been constrained by India’s growing assertiveness. The SCO setback and Xi’s BRICS absence both demonstrate that India is no longer willing to be a junior partner in China-led frameworks when doing so compromises its core interests.
Third, the regional dynamics in South Asia have not evolved as favorably for China as Beijing might have hoped. At the same time, India’s pragmatic engagement and domestic politics of the region have slowed down China’s momentum in South Asia. Despite massive investments and diplomatic efforts, China has failed to create the stable pro-China coalition in South Asia that its strategy requires.
The Imperative of Managed Competition
The current phase of India-China relations represents a mature recognition by both sides that their relationship must be managed rather than resolved. The structural factors that drive competition—territorial disputes, strategic rivalry, and conflicting regional ambitions—are unlikely to disappear in the near term. However, both nations have demonstrated that these tensions need not preclude functional cooperation in areas of mutual interest.
The path forward requires what might be termed “managed competition”. This framework acknowledges the reality of strategic rivalry while creating mechanisms for preventing escalation and promoting cooperation where possible. The recent diplomatic progress, from the Kazan reset to the restoration of various cooperation mechanisms, provides a foundation for this approach.
Success will depend on both nations’ ability to compartmentalise their differences and recognise that their shared interests in regional stability and economic development outweigh their competitive impulses. The “Dragon-Elephant tango” metaphor, while optimistic, captures an essential truth: both nations are too large and too important to ignore each other. Their ability to dance together rather than step on each other’s feet will significantly influence the trajectory of Asian and global affairs in the coming decades.
The stakes could not be higher. Nuclear-armed neighbours with combined populations exceeding 2.8 billion people and economies representing a significant portion of global GDP. India and China have both the opportunity and the responsibility to demonstrate that great power competition can be managed constructively. The hot and cold ties have increased the complexity, danger and uncertainty. Their success or failure in this endeavour will serve as a crucial test case for international relations in the multipolar era.
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