Will Xi Jinping go down in the history as a “Great Statesman and Enlightened Despot” or be viewed as tyrant responsible for the downfall of Chinese Communist Party and Peoples Republic of China, only posterity can determine!
Brig (Retd) GB Reddy
On expected lines, Xi Jinping was endorsed as ‘President for Life’ beyond 2023 by the Chinese Parliament also on March 11. Earlier, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on March 5 had approved removal of the two-term limit for the Presidency. Now, Xi is destined to lead China until he dies, chooses to step down or is purged.
China/ Analysis : Bumpy Road Ahead
Strangely, Indian media gave higher precedence to Sri Devi’s death instead of insights into the far reaching implications of Xi Jinping as “Emperor of China” on India’s geo political concerns and its disputed borders. It would also impact the Indian Ocean Region, South Asia and Asia Pacific Region.
Even experienced Western observers of Chinese politics are surprised by the timing. Sudden regression from collective autocracy into full-blown dictatorship is viewed with awe by both inside and outside China. At a time when Xi is presenting China to the world as a modern, reliable and responsible state, the internal political system is regressing, inward-looking and brutal.
When Xi came to power half a decade ago, some commentators in the West imagined him leading China down the road of political change. Instead, Xi ushered in a stiffening authoritarianism, purging thousands of political opponents, squeezing the already narrow space for civil society and presiding over the creation of a cutting-edge 21st century surveillance state.
As per experts, the reason for the early decisive shift is quite clear—likely abatement of authority as 2022/2023 nears. “Why risk diminished power three years from now if the economy tanks or there’s a conflagration with North Korea, and not have the ability to do it?”
Be that as it may, Xi and the CCP are following not only Confucian thought but also Montesquieu (The Spirit of Laws): “Republics were best suited to the small countries, limited monarchies to the middle sized and more prosperous, and enlightened despotism’s to the large nations”. Leadership imperative is clear: “Great statesman with great notions can create great nations”. Will Xi Jinping go down in the history as a “Great Statesman and Enlightened Despot” or be viewed as tyrant responsible for the downfall of CCP and Peoples Republic of China (PRC), only posterity can determine!
Xi’s move should be seen in a broader global context. For years, Chinese officials and state media have frowned at Western lectures about China’s single party CCP political system. With democracy in decline in Western societies and the dogmatic claim that economic freedom leads to political freedom now looks too simplistic (no relationship between the two), Xi has sought to present China as a model for other countries, a meritocratic autocracy that has presided over fast economic growth and avoided the muddle and policy lurches of democracy.
Let us review the recent developments in China. In 1980s, Deng Xiaoping imposed two-term limit to avoid the chaos—Cultural Revolution due to personal whims of Mao Zedong—that had marked the Mao era and its immediate aftermath. Xi, who was born in 1953, will be 69 when his term as general secretary of the Party ends in 2022. Xi heads the three pillars of power in China: party Chairman, President, and Head of the Central Military Commission. As per norms, leaders cannot serve a new term after 68 years of age. If Xi intends to serve a 3rd term as President, he will be general secretary beyond age limit.
When Xi speaks of reform, he does not mean political reform, it can wait until 2049. In his private speech, Xi is explicit: “Some people define reform as changes towards the universal values of the West— the Western political system. This is a stealthy tampering with the concept and a misunderstanding of our reform. Our reform is the one that keeps us moving forward on the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
An expanded view of Xi’s “China Dream” is about building a resilient authoritarianism through purges, austerity and “rectification”, to enable China to resume a place at the forefront of the world. Quite often, Xi has been highlighting China’s special history, culture and circumstances, justifying its different path. Xi has been emphasising the importance of “patriotic education” in schools and universities. The central project of the ‘China Dream’ is shaping the minds of its young citizens before they”re exposed to alternative viewpoints.
The Central Party School is teaching Confucius as well as Marxism-Leninism. Through the ‘rectification campaign based on patriotic education’, Xi is consolidating his sway over the psyche of people. And, the army remains the foundation of China and ultimate guarantee of the party”s rule. The party controls the military. It doesn’t belong to the country or the people.
To understand the Chinese shifting and dynamic postures, one must first understand its social chemistry. Civilisation is what defines China. The things that define for the Chinese, who they are and what China is, are a product not of the past 200 years of calling itself a nation-state but 3,000 years of being a civilisation-state. In the 5th Century BC, Europe had Socrates and China had Confucius. Both philosophers thought hard about ethics, and the right relationship between the individual and the state. The values associated with Confucius continue to shape and mould social attitudes such as harmony, stability, order, or the state as a microcosm of the family.
Xi’s key challenge is to justify the party’s continuing monopolisation of state power when Marxism has lost its broad appeal and the Soviet model has long since collapsed. Xi has seized upon the party’s recent rehabilitation of Confucianism, formerly condemned as the symbol of benighted feudalism, and gone further by resurrecting China’s competing ancient philosophy of legalism, which preached the virtues of a harsh government’s use of law as an instrument of dictatorship. Xi’s emerging rationalisation of his unrestricted power might be termed “legalist Leninism.”
Xi has successfully arrogated himself as the “Hexin or Core” of the leadership, and eliminated rivals through a rigorous anti-corruption campaign. Xi’s ideological contributions—Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era—enshrined in the party’s constitution, is the guiding new ideological principle. It raises Xi to the same level as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Furthermore, a new anti-corruption commission would expand the reach of corruption investigations what with Wang Qishan, 69, a close ally of Xi in his campaign against corruption and disloyalty in the party, appears set to return to power as Vice President.
Xi packed the Central Committee and its two higher organs, the Politburo Standing Committee (top decision-making body) and the Politburo, with loyal followers, all of whom will be too old to stand a chance of taking his place at the next party congress, in 2022. Of the seven members of the CCP’s last Standing Committee, only two remain: Xi and his deputy, Premier Li Keqiang. Five other members are all new, and four of them are allies of Xi. Not one of them is qualified by rank and age to succeed Xi. 15 of 25 Politburo members have histories with Xi dating back to his early service in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces. The other ten include technocrats, a token woman, and the standard two military officers, who owe their promotions to Xi. Thus, Xi will be emperor for life.
Quite explicit is Xi’s vision for China: “Chinese Dream”— Rejuvenation of the Middle Kingdom through “Two Centenaries” and, “Four Comprehensives” and 10 enduring strategic priorities as core security strategic objectives to achieve specific goals. The “Two Centenaries” include: by 2021, when the CCP celebrates its centenary, complete the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous and strong; by 2049, when PRC marks its centenary, culturally advanced and harmonious in all respects, democratic, with a strong military to make China the world’s dominant power, while consolidating and advancing enduring single party CCP rule. Taiwan’s national reintegration and maintaining territorial sovereignty and maritime rights particularly in the South China Sea are non-negotiable. But, China would tread the ‘middle path between peace and crisis escalation’ in short and midterm contexts” best suited to national interests.
Xi Jinping has shifted gears from defensive-reactive to offensive-proactive strategic mode on all fronts. His policy prescriptions in all fields reflect his strategic leadership potential: “balancing-against-capabilities.” China is transforming in all fields—social, political, economic, technology, diplomatic and military. China’s resurgence and increased international engagement under Xi Jinping is real. “Made in China by 2025—10-year action plan based on One Two Three Five-Five Ten” is designed to transform China from a manufacturing giant into a world manufacturing power—“Technology Superpower”.
China is already “Economic Superpower” ($23.57 Trillion by PPP 2017; and 12.40 Trillion by nominal 2017) and maintaining steady GDP growth at 6.9 per cent in 2017. Xi appears to be pursuing a more evolutionary path to reshape China’s economic landscape. However, Xi would need to reallocate capital from the more economically advanced coast and Yangtze River basin. As China also tries to transition away from low-end manufacturing and economic stimulus driven by government-financed construction, it is the low end of the economic spectrum that will be disproportionally affected. But it is far from certain that China has the time to allow for this slow change, as the rest of the global economy is shifting with or without Chinese consensus. Thus, Xi faces a year of potentially contentious issues: subduing economic uncertainties that have eroded investors’ confidence in his acumen and continuing an anticorruption drive that has sapped officials’ incomes and morale.
With the mindset of a great power, Xi has clearly articulated foreign policy guidelines: challenging the balance of power that existed since World War II; and, demanding the USA to treat China as an ‘equal power’. Today, China views itself as equal to the USA and Europe in terms of economic power. By establishing a new national security council, Xi Jinping has made it clear that he sees a link between ideological menaces to one-party rule and strategic threats abroad, especially from the USA.
More importantly, Xi has staked his claims to ‘global leadership role” through agile and smart diplomatic calisthenics with Chinese finesse. He has launched the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS New Development Bank, and negotiated the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, as opposed to the USA-backed Trans-Pacific Partnership.
However, despite a fierce anti-corruption campaign, resurgence in nationalism and crackdown on human rights, internal security threats such as democracy activism, ethnic dissidence, widening gap between the rich and the poor, the coast and the interior regional inequalities constitute grave threats to national security, particularly single party CCP rule.
Dictatorships may be able to make some decisions more easily than democratic or consensus-based systems. But, there are dangers of centralising too much power in one man’s hands; lonely man at the top can easily become paranoid. Decision making will be slow. Officials will wait for guidance rather than offering suggestions, and internal Party dissent will be replaced by loyalty bordering on sycophancy. Also, party veterans in future will assert their right to continue in power. Leadership transitions may descend into wars. Preserving unity in the Party will be much harder, with consequences for the stability that Chinese so value.
And Xi’s absolute authority will also leave him vulnerable to absolute blame in the instance of an economic shock or foreign policy crisis like Taiwan. However, analysts also believe that what initially seems like a demonstration of absolute power could actually be a sign of weakness, with Xi apparently unwilling to allow the rise of a potential political rival. This could lead to future instability in the world”s populous country as wannabe successors jockey for power within a CCP completely dominated by Xi.
Should the current single party system fail, it would throw the entire international system into turmoil. An uncertain China would make the various crises the world faces today look tame. On the other hand, if the current transformation continues, China will have the economic and military might to threaten both Japan and Taiwan in the region as well as the West. With its effort to develop a high technology economic system, China has set the foundation that will likely ensure that it is much stronger than Russia and even matches the US by 2049.
What challenges lie ahead for India to deal with China under Xi Jinping’s very well articulated “Chinese Dream—Rejuvenation of the Middle Kingdom”. Should China emerge as the “Dominant Power” incrementally at global level by 2049, what policies and strategies India should formulate to forge relations—rival, competitor or collaborator? In the case of collapse of the single-party CCP rule contingency and instability in China, what should be Indian response? Indian analyst must stop building “castles in the air” on India as the next emerging “Asian Giant”. Regression of democracy—messy bordering anarchy and chaos —with consensual populist decision making at the top, which will continue to haunt India, cannot match Xi and China in short and mid-term contexts.
(The writer is Hyderabad-based strategic analyst)
Comments