Diffusion of Doklam standoff must not create a false impression of a diplomatic victory. Rather it should be taken as a warning about China’s strong-arm tactics and expansionist policy
Brig (Retd) G B Reddy
Indian media coverage during the over two-month-long standoff on the Sikkim-Tibet-Bhutan tri junction overlooking the Doklam Plateau glaringly exposes strategic short-sightedness and bankruptcy on the part of Defence and Diplomatic experts.
Claiming it to be a “huge victory for India” and a “diplomatic win” is much ado about nothing. To expect that things will be fine after the pull back by both sides is patently a myopic – short sighted – strategic view.
“China Gazers” are many, yet Chinese initiatives remain shrouded in mystery. Almost 75 years ago, Churchill said of Russia, “It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma. He might well say the same of China today.”
“China Gazers/Experts” must not turn a blind eye to the pattern of Chinese intrusions. Simultaneously on the sidelines, there was a stone-pelting clash on the banks of the Pangong Lake in Ladakh, which was diffused after a flag meeting.
Not to be forgotten were the Chinese incursions in Ladakh
preceding and coinciding with the visits of Xi Jinping’s visit to India and also intrusion at Depsang Valley few days prior to Li Keqiang’s, Chinese Premier, visit in 2013 leading to a three-week-long confrontation.
Not to forget China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh in 2006 prior to the then Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit. Similarly, before Premier Wen Jiabao’s much-publicised trip to India in 2010, China began issuing visas on loose paper stapled into the passports of residents from Jammu and Kashmir applying for a visa for China.
Repeating Incursions
Ipso facto, over 300 incidents of incursions by the Chinese troops have been reported from January to September 17, 2014. After all, a total 1,619 incidents of PLA intrusions have been reported from 2009 to 2014.
Coinciding the timing of these incidents with high-level visits from China or Summit events is a clear reflection of China’s strong arm bullying tactics. It is highly calculative and deliberate – keep crisis hot spots in limelight to settle in times to come at an opportune moment.
In the past, a Singaporean official succinctly stated: “The Chinese charm you when they want to charm you; squeeze you when they want to squeeze you, and they do it quite
systematically.”
Let me highlight that Chinese national pride, as an ancient and proud civilisation, sets them apart from others. The legacy of “The Middle Kingdom” as the center of the universe, continues to hold sway over its foreign policies. Relations with aliens were mostly tributary; as vassals rather than equals. It remained unchanged until the 20th century.
Today, China is not a status quoist power; but a revisionist power aspiring to be a Great Power. China is bent upon reclaiming its “Middle Kingdom” status by overcoming what it views as “barbarian encirclement”, “a century of humiliation” and “accidents of history” when colonial powers imposed unfair treaties on China. China’s historical grievances and sentiments against the USA, the West, and the rest cannot be easily wished away or set aside. India is no exception.
China’s Dream
Chinese strategic initiative not only on its borders with India but also in the Far East, the South China Sea and other borders with neighbors flow out of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”. Achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation includes:
“Two Centenaries”; and “Four Comprehensives.”
The “Two Centenaries” are specific. By 2021, when the CCP
celebrates its centenary, complete the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious in all respects, with a strong military to make China by 2049 the world’s dominant power, when Peoples Republic of China (PRC) marks its centenary.
Strategic expert’s world over recognise China’s rise today. It’s increased international engagement over the last few decades is real. China is bidding for time to assume global leadership pole position through its public posturing of win-win diplomacy, Confucian benevolence, and strategic economic partnerships.
Xi Jinping endorsed former President Hu Jintao’s view that “the first two decades of the 21st century as a period of “strategic opportunity” for its growth and development.” Xi’s intent is to take advantage and prolong the window of opportunity.
Unless compelled to do so, Xi Jinping, as a pragmatist, may
continue to pursue peaceful development path. Where it hurts China’s national interests, China may apply strategy of ambiguity through the doctrine of “Creeping Incrementalism and Extended Coercion interwoven with strands of suspense, suspicion, surprise and coercion”, in a more assertive and aggressive manner.
In April 2014, the BBC quoted retired Chinese Gen. Xu Guangyu as saying, “It’s just as Napoleon said when China wakes, it will shake the world and the Americans can’t bear it. We’ve woken up and we’re
recovering our might.”
Sleeping Lion
A former Colonel stated later, “China was once called the sleeping lion in the East, but now we have been awakened, and Xi Jinping is the leading lion of the lion packs, who dares to fight anytime.”
In retrospect, the Doklam standoff and the bellicose rhetoric in Chinese media followed by tactical withdrawal need to be viewed in such a framework. What may follow later is, therefore, difficult to forecast. My deduction may be as good anyone else.
Chinese view of global affairs is long term based. Zhou Enlai, Kissinger’s counterpart under Mao, when asked what he thought of the French Revolution, replied that “it was too early to tell.” Even Mao Zedong stated “willing to wait for a hundred years to settle reunification of Taiwan.” Their strategic thinking and approach is based on a long term view.
Undeniably, China is asserting its hegemony on its periphery as a regional power by keeping alive its historical claims. As China increases it power potential incrementally by either 2022 or by 2030, it would certainly more aggressively stake its claims by all means and ways.
Soft Power
Next, China’s use of “Soft Power” is extraordinarily agile – smart and dynamic, and fast and flexible to cope with rapidly changing scenarios at all levels in all fields. From the defensive and reactive use of soft power along with diplomacy of Mao’s Sino centrist and isolationist policies, China’s policies and strategies on the diplomatic front are today proactive, pre-emptive and coercive.
With the USA retracting under Trump’s vision – America First; and Make America Great Again – China has the opportunity to assume the global leadership role and preside over new regional and international order. It’s Belt and Road Initiative is viewed in such a strategic perspective.
Nonetheless, China also faces a key strategic challenge in the Korean Peninsula. Any instability in the Korean Peninsula is contra Chinese national security interests.
Furthermore, China also faces internal security challenges from within – Tibet and Xinjiang. To get embroiled in a full scale war at this point of time does not offer any strategic gains.
If China has adopted a “wait and watch” policy, it is to avoid “imperial overstretch’ that was responsible for the fall of many great powers in mankind’s history.
Blow Hot, Blow Cold
China is well-positioned to achieve its strategic ends if it maintains its present blow-hot and blow-cold strategic path. Any interruption, by indulging in a conflict with nations small or big, would not only damage but derail the levels of progress that are essential to achieve end objectives prescribed for 2021 and 2049.
To interpret China’s move to defuse the situation in Doklam due to India’s firm riposte or submission to India’s will is, therefore, patently a misplaced self-congratulatory adulation.
Ipso facto, China views India as a rival in South Asia. Mutual suspicion is real with regard to each other’s intentions and actions since the 1950s. Both nations suffer from ‘siege” mentality.
Chinese view India’s rise as a mid and long term strategic threat concern in its pursuit to reclaim its lost glory and global leadership eminence. Its strategic alliance with Pakistan and its forays into Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and other countries in the Indian Ocean Region are reflective of its futuristic strategic course. It is an established fact that its mindset is shaped by “No place for two tigers at the top of a mountain”.
At the same time, China certainly would not like disruption to oil supplies through the Indian Ocean which is bound to adversely impact its economic growth which is no longer on ‘double digit’ growth; but below 7%.
Be that as it may, excessive obsession with the need to prevent disruption to key events like the BRICS summit need not be viewed as a high priority for China today. It is quite insignificant in today’s dynamic, extraordinarily complex and uncertain situation, particularly in the face of Korean Peninsula and South China Sea crisis situations.
Mao’s Ghost
Of course, the 19th Party Congress is intended to sustain his legacy and leave Xi Jinping on par with Chairman Mao. So, Xi Jinping is playing his cards ‘close to his chest’ in his external and internal dealings.
In sum, disengagement in Doklam needs to be reviewed carefully and deliberatively based on various scenarios that may unfold in times to come.
India must, therefore, prepare to face far more serious contingencies and consequences whilst keeping doors of diplomatic dialogue open over final resolution of border disputes in a win-win outcome in a give and take exchange.
(The writer is a Strategic Expert)
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