Few activities are as intrinsic to the Bharatiya experience as police verification. From passport applications and OCI cards, to emigration permissions, employment checks and business set-ups – the list of activities requiring police verification is extensive. Over time, this practice has expanded to new areas: many housing societies and states now require landlords to conduct mandatory verification of tenants and even gig economy workers(e.g. Uber, Rapido) often need a Police Clearance Certificate (PCC) or other police checks in order to make a living.
In theory, all these verifications help to ensure the public’s safety and peace of mind. Yet, the practical reality is very different. Police verification is often the start of a taxing process: individuals are often asked to come to the police station instead of having checks conducted at their residence, documents that were previously submitted for the passport application are demanded again (along with a compendium of other information), and officials often communicate with applicants over Whatsapp and other informal systems. The process is slow-moving and opaque – and unfortunately, bribes often facilitate quicker clearance.
Four key harms of the existing system
As a result, instead of ensuring public security, the process often inconveniences citizens and frustrates the extensive, ongoing efforts by the government to buttress national security. The existing process leads to 4 clear harms: Lowered barriers for cybercrime, security risks, normalisation of bribery and poor Police-Citizen relations.
Lowered barriers for cybercrime: The first and least discussed, risk from the existing process is its ability to inadvertently facilitate cybercrime, particularly for vulnerable groups.
Consider the manner in which many average middle-class Indians are informed about the initiation of police verification: An individual claiming to be a police official contacts the applicant via Whatsapp, SMS or an email sent from an address ending with “gmail.com” (or that of other email providers). The ‘police official’ then requests the presence of the individual at a police station to submit a list of documents – and may also request online copies be sent over email as well. As the process of police verification continues over subsequent weeks, the applicant may continue to get phone calls, text messages or emails from other officials within the department, each contacting the applicant through the same informal channels.
On the face of it, these practices seem harmless – or even a wonderful example of a Digital India speeding up communication between the government and common citizens. Yet, its effect is much more insidious: Citizens grow to see government officials liasing with them through informal channels – including requesting their presence at physical locations or demanding documents – as completely normal.
It is no surprise, therefore, that many Indians instinctively pick up a call (or open an attachment) from Whatsapp numbers or Skype IDs that have profile pictures of an official in government uniform. This has serious consequences: In 2025, MoS Home Affairs, Shri Bandi Sanjay Kumar, informed Parliament that there were more than 1.23 lakh digital arrest style cybercrimes in India in 2024 – an over 300 per cent increase from 2022. Financial losses were even more extreme, rising approximately 2123 per cent, to 1935 crore. Indeed, India has been described as being uniquely susceptible to the ‘digital arrest’ scam.
To be clear, police officials using informal communication channels is hardly the sole causative factor for people falling prey to digital arrests and other forms of cybercrime. Yet, it contributes to the problem by removing the natural barrier of skepticism that common citizens would normally have for such forms of communication.
Security risks: The second issue, and one of increasing salience given the current security environment, is the risk to national security. Inspite of regulations requiring police verification to be conducted through a home check, it is very common for this to be conducted at the local police station instead. Applicants are simply asked to turn up at the police thana and bring along key documents for verification.
This poses major risks to public safety because address verification is never conducted. Without this, there is no way of genuinely confirming that the applicant resides in the location they claim to be. Moreover, the outdated reliance on furnishing paper documents for identity proof leaves the system prone to ‘fraudulent document’ rackets, something that is all the easier to achieve with AI tools. This can be exploited by various types of bad faith actors, including those involved in criminal activity or illegal immigrants.
Indeed, various media reports have previously discussed the ease with which address verification and other police checks can be circumvented for drivers at ride-hailing firms. Similarly, a 2023 case in Pune revealed that six illegal immigrants from Bangladesh had managed to acquire Indian passports by presenting fake rent agreements executed in the name of a then-deceased lady.
Normalisation of bribery: Thirdly, the slow-moving and opaque nature of police verifications lends itself to petty corruption. The blame for this does not rest solely on police forces alone; while in many cases it is the officials who(indirectly or directly) solicit bribes, citizens too are happy to proactively offer bribes in the hopes of speeding up the process.
It goes without saying that the continued normalisation of such bribery is actively harmful to Bharat’s long-term aspirations. If verifications are completed thoroughly, then using bribery to ‘shortcut’ the process implies a weakening of standards that defeats the entire purpose of verification. On the other hand, if verifications are being delayed simply to solicit bribes, then this is a classic case of what academic Yuen Yuen Ang describes as ‘speed money’ (petty bribes paid to low-level bureaucrats to circumvent hurdles or delays). Economic research has consistently demonstrated that this form of corruption slows economic growth – and Bharat’s relatively higher rate of this form of corruption vis-à-vis China is a contributing factor to its slower growth trajectory.
Poor police-citizen relations: Finally, even if all else goes right, the slow-moving and laborious nature of the process leads to a hemorrhaging of faith in police services. When applicants have to endure a run-around – and have to furnish an extensive range of information, ranging from Birth Certificates, to ID proof, to seemingly-unnecessary Board exam marksheets – frustration is directed towards the institution. Such interactions have helped to develop the famous aversion to police work and ‘court-kacheri’ amongst the Indian middle class. In turn, people become less likely to seek police assistance for serious issues and crimes, preferring instead to try for community-level solutions, because they believe that police involvement will only delay and complicate matters.
Reforming Police Verification: A modern solution already exists
Yet, reforming and modernizing the system is very much achievable because of the building blocks of digitalization and stronger systems that have been systematically put in place by the Government over the last decade. There are 5 key elements needed for successful reform – each drawing on existing reforms that have been implemented by Central and State governments:
- Single, comprehensive national portal: A ‘One Nation, One Police Verification Portal’ should be instituted which comprehensively covers all the circumstances where police verification is required – and communicates with relevant agency databases. For instance, for a passport application, the police authorities will receive verified documents from the MEA through the portal. This eliminates the need for applicants to provide two sets of documents. If additional documents are requested by the police, applicants should be informed of this through automated emails/text messages and then have the option to submit this information onto the portal by linking with DigiLocker, Aadhaar and other identity systems. A national portal would allow police forces to understand the history of previous police checks conducted, and ensure cross-checking across States so that no one can evade checks by moving across State boundaries.
- Official communication channels: On a similar vein, rules should be introduced mandating contact with applicants solely through official email addresses that end with a standard code e.g. [email protected] to ensure that residents can quickly determine if the communication is genuine. This communication should be generated through the national portal, such that there is a record of all communication that can be viewed for future police checks. If SMS or Whatsapp communication options are considered essential, these too should be generated through the national portal and appropriate policies formulated so that applicants can easily determine whether the person contacting them is a genuine police official. For instance, a unique time- and person-specific Unique Contact Code could be sent as part of the text. This code could be entered on the national portal by applicants to cross-verify details of who is contacting them and the purpose of contact.
- Verifiable address checks: The next step is to ensure that police officials always turn up at the applicant’s address. This should be achieved through a location-tagged, date-and-time stamped photo at the applicant’s house or apartment, which should be uploaded onto the national portal. The technology for this already exists, having been rolled out for the MGNREGA scheme to track worker attendance and work completion. Although police officials may have to conduct address verification in areas with poor mobile connectivity, this challenge has been accounted for in the MGNREGA app where photos taken offline are stored for upload until the user reaches an area with mobile connectivity. This will ensure that police officials physically check that the applicant is residing at their stated address, giving a boost to public security by reducing misrepresentation.
- Aadhaar-based identity verification: Yet, if the aim is to check fraud and crime, it will not be enough to verify the address alone – it must be ensured that police officials check that the applicant indeed resides at that address. This can be achieved through Aadhaar-based fingerprinting or face scans, conducted during the address check. A simple scan using a portable device that marks the applicant’s presence on the national Police Verification Portal can provide proof of residence at the address. The same principle can be applied to neighbour verification, since the identity documents and written statements of the neighbours are almost invariably requested.
- Body worn cameras: Finally, body-worn cameras should be mandated for all interactions during address checks and police verification procedures. This will make the process of giving or receiving bribes much more challenging. In combination with gradual social change and tighter regulations, this may assist with curbing ‘speed money’ corruption in India over time. Finally, to cover the costs of travel, administration and expenses for police departments, Bharat can consider instituting a standard verification fee for all police checks following global practices as in countries like Singapore and Australia. However, care must be taken to ensure that ‘speed money’ practices have reduced (and invite strict punishment) – if not this becomes a ‘double fee’ that will cause public angst.
Reforming police verification is a national security imperative
With rising geopolitical tensions, recent alerts about terror threats to Delhi and the Prime Minister’s warnings about a “premeditated conspiracy” of infiltration, reforming the existing process of police verification is key to bolstering national security and marching towards Viksit Bharat. Through targeted Centre-State collaboration and technology deployment, the archaic practice of police verification can be modernized for the digital age. A Naya Bharat needs a Naya Verification System.
