Bharat’s refusal to endorse the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) joint statement at Qingdao, after it deliberately omitted reference to the heinous April 22 Pahalgam terror attack, marked a watershed moment in India’s diplomatic trajectory. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s principled stand was not just a bureaucratic objection but a bold assertion of Bharat’s red lines. It signalled to the world that New Delhi will no longer play along with multilateral forums that indulge in semantic equivocation and moral ambivalence on terrorism. More significantly, this act of non-signature was not impulsive—it was a culmination of consistent efforts by India to seek recognition of its security concerns within the SCO framework.
Some may argue that India should have worked harder behind the scenes to ensure the inclusion of the Pahalgam attack in the final declaration. However, such assertions ignore the reality that India had, in fact, engaged with SCO members at multiple levels—through diplomatic channels, backdoor consultations, and through forums like the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). Based in Tashkent, RATS was created to foster cooperation among member states to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism. India has been a part of RATS since 2005 and has shared critical intelligence inputs on terror networks, particularly those emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite this, the deliberate omission of the Pahalgam terror attack, suggests that the resistance to naming Pakistan-based terrorism is structural—not a failure of Indian diplomacy, but a reflection of geopolitical alignments within the SCO.
The SCO, founded in 2001 and headquartered in Beijing, positions itself as a platform for promoting regional peace, stability, and counter-terrorism cooperation across Eurasia. Its founding members include China, Russia, and several Central Asian republics, and it now includes Pakistan, India, and more recently Iran. India became a full member in 2017, expecting that membership would open doors to Central Asia, improve energy and security ties, and allow it to present a strong case against Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism on a global stage. In theory, the SCO offered India a platform to voice concerns, build influence, and assert its role in Eurasian affairs. In practice, however, the organisation’s deep internal contradictions—primarily the presence of China and Pakistan as key members—have consistently hampered India’s ability to assert itself meaningfully. The expectation of balanced multilateralism often collapses under the weight of strategic rivalries and geopolitical vetoes.
At its inception, India’s decision to join SCO was guided by rational geopolitical calculus. The organisation provided an avenue to engage with energy-rich Central Asia—an area of strategic interest historically dominated by Russian and Chinese influence. SCO also offered RATS as an institutional mechanism to monitor terror networks operating in and around Pakistan. For a nation facing continuous hybrid warfare from its western neighbour, such platforms could, in principle, contribute to intelligence gathering and collective action. Moreover, participation in SCO fit into India’s broader strategic doctrine of multi-alignment—cooperating with diverse global actors while maintaining sovereign autonomy. The inclusion in SCO also allowed India to keep a direct line of dialogue open with its adversaries, enabling both deterrence and diplomatic signalling in a shared space.
Yet, the optimism with which India entered the SCO has often clashed with its operational realities. India is frequently expected to sit across the table from Pakistan—a state that openly supports terror networks and continues to bleed India through a thousand cuts. Multilateral statements that ignore terror attacks on Indian soil while pontificating on regional stability reek of duplicity. The omission of the Pahalgam terror attack from the SCO statement is not a bureaucratic oversight; it is a deliberate political choice to shield Pakistan and dilute the global discourse on terrorism. This raises fundamental questions about the ethical coherence and moral legitimacy of such groupings. If India must continuously protest and object merely to have its security concerns acknowledged, one must ask whether the platform truly serves our national interest.
Furthermore, the SCO is increasingly tilting toward serving China’s geopolitical interests. Beijing exerts disproportionate control over the organisation’s secretariat, policy direction, and procedural outcomes. It often uses the platform to expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) agenda, which India has rightfully opposed on grounds of sovereignty and transparency. China’s unholy nexus with Pakistan is visible even within the SCO, where efforts to name and shame terror networks are diluted, and security dialogue becomes hostage to strategic rivalry. In this context, India’s role is often reduced to reactive diplomacy—registering objections and abstaining from flawed statements rather than shaping the agenda proactively. China and Pakistan appear to use the SCO as a shield to legitimise their geopolitical ambitions while isolating dissenting voices.
India’s discomfort with SCO is also emblematic of a broader dilemma facing rising powers: should a civilisational state like Bharat continue to be part of platforms that do not share its core values, merely for strategic access? The answer is not straightforward. The question of whether India should exit the SCO has begun to surface in strategic circles. Proponents of this view argue that the organisation, given its structural bias and political apathy toward India’s core concerns, serves little utility. Why, they ask, should India remain in a body that legitimises Pakistan and ignores Indian lives lost to terrorism? The moral outrage is valid. Yet, immediate withdrawal may undermine India’s long-term strategic goals. A vacuum left by India in the SCO would almost certainly be filled by China and Pakistan, giving them unchallenged dominance in Eurasian narratives. Exiting now may also isolate India from Central Asian republics who value India’s civilisational and strategic depth.
Instead, what India needs is a recalibrated strategy. It must continue to engage, but with clarity and conviction. India should use every SCO platform to expose Pakistan’s duplicity, challenge Chinese hegemony, and build bilateral relations with Central Asian nations independent of SCO’s limitations. The recent visit of the External Affairs Minister to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for energy cooperation is a case in point. Parallel initiatives—such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Chabahar port development, and India-Central Asia Summits—must be leveraged to reduce dependence on SCO alone. India should pursue stronger linkages through regional blocs such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and cultural diplomacy efforts should be intensified to rekindle Bharat’s historic ties with the region.
India should also harness its cultural and civilisational soft power—such as Yog, Buddhism, Ayurved, and the shared heritage of the Silk Route—to deepen its appeal among SCO countries. These cultural linkages often hold more enduring value than transient geopolitical compulsions. India’s model of development and democracy also offers a stark alternative to the authoritarian templates promoted by other powers within the SCO. Through the revival of Nalanda University, Buddhist pilgrimage circuits, and language exchange programmes, India can project a narrative of harmony, resilience, and shared destiny.
Rajnath Singh’s recent stance was more than a diplomatic maneuver; it was a moral assertion. It sent a strong message that India will not allow its sacrifices to be buried under multilateral niceties. It reaffirmed that New Delhi will not compromise when it comes to terrorism, sovereignty, and national honour. This is dharmic diplomacy at its best—rooted in moral clarity and guided by strategic foresight. It is a template for the future.
India’s SCO policy must therefore be driven by realism tempered with resolve, by strategy informed by sanskar, and by participation aligned with principle. Bharat’s role in the SCO should not be of a reluctant observer, nor a submissive participant, but that of a conscious and assertive power that challenges inertia, speaks uncomfortable truths, and redefines the very norms of multilateral diplomacy. Only then can India’s presence in such platforms truly honour the spirit of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, while never forgetting that Rashtra Pratham—Nation First—is our guiding light.
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