After almost two weeks of the Pahalgam massacre, India retaliated by carrying out cross-border strikes with precision and depth. According to a press release under Operation Sindoor, altogether nine terror camps and headquarters of Jaish and Lashkar were targeted in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied J&K (PoJK). While India showed its strong will to strike back by carrying out cross-border strikes, the strategic message was beyond punishment this time.
The Strike Back Patterns
Until now, India’s strike-back pattern has suggested a punitive deterrence with a limited hitting range. Uri strikes in 2016 and Balakot Strikes in 2019 demonstrated India’s capability to enforce punitive deterrence against Pakistan by sending the strategic message that any undesirable behaviour will be met with a swift and severe response. In fact, after the Parliament attacks, India launched Operation Parakram, which was also an attempt to demonstrate an act of punitive deterrence, but punitive deterrence became an ineffective strike-back option as Pakistan built a perception that India’s deterrence behaviour could be sustained with the ability to counter-strike as they were credible and had a limited hitting range. Pakistan’s perception was demonstrated in Operation Swift Retort when Pakistan swiftly acted the next day after the Balakot strikes by breaching India’s airspace with JF-17s and attempting to carry out air strikes on non-military targets in J&K. While the escalation ladder was in a pretty controlled state from both sides. Still, India’s larger objectives of enforcing deterrence against Pakistan remain somewhat unclear, as both states have resorted to punitive deterrence, effectively reducing the effectiveness of deterrence against Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan didn’t learn its lessons. It continued its terror operations in J&K and even shaped its sub-conventional tactics to such an extent that it could launch deep terror strikes with an element of plausible deniability.- Creating offshoots and front organisations like The Resistance Front.
The concept of configuring strong offensive deterrence was outlined in the vision paper, ‘India’s Army Perspective Plan 2000,’ by former Chief of Army Staff General Krishnaswamy Sundarji. He argued that for Pakistan, we have to adopt a maximised offensive deterrence ranging from seizure of territory to destruction of Pakistan’s military and economic capabilities. Similarly, another former Chief of Army Staff, General Sundarajan Padmanabhan, who oversaw India’s Operation Parakram, said, “Perpetrator would be punished so severely that its continuation thereafter in any form would be in doubt” Both the Generals echoed “, maximum and credible deterrence against Pakistan, not aiming to punish Pakistan but to escalate deterrence and offensive measures to such extent that Pakistan’s sub-conventional warfare capability gets eroded but this erosion requires continuity in delivery of credible deterrence such as done in Operation Sindoor.
Swift Shift
Operation Sindoor demonstrated three key swift shifts from earlier striking patterns. First, India expanded its striking horizon by going beyond Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and striking deep inside Pakistan by targeting key cities- Bhawalpur and Muridke. Second, multiple targets increase operational selectivity, which was previously limited to only one or two camps. Third, attempt to push Multi-Domain Defence against Pakistan. India’s five-pointer diplomatic strike after a few days of the attack, which notably included keeping the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance to isolating Pakistan’s diplomatic and economic potential, was an attempt to bring double squeeze strategy into play by exploiting and exacerbating Pakistan’s internal weakness at one end and strategically isolating at the global stage- miserable failure of Pakistan at UNSC closed-door meeting despite launching renewed decades-old narrative of “false flag” is one testament of strategic isolation. Earlier, India’s isolatory approach towards Pakistan had demonstrated ordinary diplomatic measures, but this time, India attempted to demonstrate some extraordinary diplomatic measures, adding the actual element of multi-domain deterrence. Overall, this time, India’s strategic response demonstrated its capability to impose a sustained, credible and multi-dimensional deterrence against Pakistan.
Operation Sindoor echoes the beginning of a shift from immediate deterrence to long-term credible deterrence against Pakistan. The idea of long-term credible deterrence can push Pakistan to the margins if India continues to develop its long-term deterrence by adding more credibility by precisely striking the Octopus- the head of terror outfits in future. This shift in deterrence against Pakistan will force Pakistan to realise the new strategic reality that any misadventure would be met with an overwhelming response, not limited to plain responses. India’s Operation Sindoor also gives a glimpse that India is also chalking a path of integrated deterrence and gradually departing from the traditional notion of deterrence, a similar move that the United States did in its National Defence Strategy after realising increasing threats and risks to its strategic security especially after 9/11 and began to sharpen its integrated deterrence in modern time after realising increased threat from rising threat from Russia and China in a heightened strategic completion environment.
Escalation Problem and Pakistan’s Response
The threat of the escalation ladder spiralling out of control is one major issue in the retaliation cycle between India and Pakistan. This gets further aggravated if the Pakistan leadership is strongly tilted towards Islamic generals- from Zia, Musharraf, Parvez Kayani, to Asim Munir. Though India has already made it clear that its actions are calculative, precise, and non-escalatory, targeting only terrorists, Pakistan has tried to play with fire when it comes to controlling escalations from unprovoked offensives at the border to launching nuclear rhetoric. Following India’s swift response, Pakistan’s top echelons may face a dilemma in delivering a reaction, considering the escalation factor, as the onus of escalation now lies with Pakistan. Last year, Pakistan carried out limited air strikes in response to Iran’s retaliatory response against anti-Iran terror groups in the bordering region of Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan might opt for limited air-to-cross-border strikes but may also exercise in-depth strikes. At present, Pakistan is attempting to flare up by indiscriminate shelling against civilians in J&K’s bordering regions. Poonch is one of the worst-hit areas by Pakistan’s shelling.
Whatever Pakistan’s response, Asim Munir must realise that he is already suffering with high costs, with his nation getting humiliated and bleeding. If Munir attempts to deliver a miscalculated response, the escalation ladder might spiral, and he may become consumed by his fire. Pakistan must also realise that it does not have many options; it cannot afford to put its strategic security at more risk, especially when Pakistan’s western frontier is almost smoked by TTP and Baloch fighters. It’s high time that Pakistan realises that now, higher costs and risks are involved in coercing India after it has demonstrated a swift shift in its deterrence against Pakistan by showing both power and resolve.
