Four years ago, a fatal military crisis at the India-China border took their relationship to a new low, where it has largely remained. In recent months, however, there has been a debate in India about the desirability of a Sino-Indian reset, i.e., whether New Delhi should make a concerted effort to resume political dialogue or resolve differences with Beijing. Given the potential impact on India’s willingness to cooperate with countries to balance China, the possibility of such a change has been a subject of interest for India’s partners.
There are reasons why the Modi government might seek to stabilise ties with China or at least set a floor for the India-China relationship. These include conflict prevention, geopolitical uncertainty, partners’ parleys with Beijing, and economic drivers. However, a tactical thaw is more likely than any structural shift away from Sino-Indian rivalry.
This is because there has already been a reset in Sino-Indian ties—to a more competitive level. And, even if there is some re-engagement, the relationship will remain there due to the range of divergences that persist between India and China.
The potential for a tactical thaw
Speculation about a shift in India’s approach got a fillip from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s comments in April that relations with China were “important and significant.” Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh said India wanted “good relations with all our neighbours.” He also remarked that border talks with Beijing were “progressive and satisfactory,” and “no fresh tension” had arisen. Moreover, fiery rhetoric against China was largely absent on the campaign trail.
The new Chinese ambassador’s arrival in India after 18 months further fueled speculation, as did the relatively mild Chinese condemnation of Modi’s post-election tweet acknowledging Taiwanese leader William Lai’s congratulations. Beijing did not publicly criticise India for hosting a U.S. congressional delegation that lambasted Beijing while visiting the Dalai Lama in India. There has also been an uptick in think tank exchanges, with Beijing touting its facilitation of Indians’ travel to China.
Singh and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar have denied that India’s approach has changed. But there are several reasons why it won’t be surprising if a third-term Modi government seeks to put relations with China on a more stable footing.
For one, New Delhi does not want another escalation at the border, where the four-year-old military standoff continues. Conflict could disrupt India’s economic growth and other objectives and have an uncertain outcome given the Sino-Indian capabilities gap.
Second, geopolitical uncertainty. Indian policymakers have already been grappling with the fallout of several global and regional crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the border clash with China, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the Israel-Gaza conflict. Then there are the tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
These crises will shape New Delhi’s thinking about a potential escalation with China. They have absorbed India’s and its partners’ bandwidth and resources needed to balance Beijing. These partners include the United States, which provided India with fast-tracked or leased military supplies, intelligence, and diplomatic support during the 2020 Sino-Indian crisis.
Meanwhile, the Russia-Ukraine war has disrupted India’s defence imports and led to greater Russian dependence on China—not ideal for an India that still deploys considerable Soviet/Russian-origin equipment on its frontline with China. On the maritime front, piracy and Houthi attacks have absorbed the Indian Navy’s attention.
The U.S. elections add another element of uncertainty—specifically, the prospect of another Trump administration. One way it might shape Indian calculations is the impact on India’s options. New Delhi appreciated the Trump administration’s competitive approach to China. However, there was some uncertainty surrounding President Donald Trump’s praise of Xi Jinping. Candidate Trump’s shift to a TikTok ban will have raised similar questions about the consistency of his view of China. India might also assess that Beijing’s concern about a second Trump term could result in a Chinese tactical rethink on India (as it seemed in fall 2017 when China sought to stabilise ties with India and Japan).
A third reason New Delhi might consider selective engagement is concern that its partners’ recent China dialogues and deals leave India vulnerable to Chinese pressure. Given historical concerns about a “G2”—a Washington-Beijing condominium—U.S.-China interactions have received particular attention. A former foreign secretary even linked the postponement of the Quad summit earlier this year to Washington’s desire for stability with Beijing. Indians would have also warily watched high-level Australia-China visits, European leaders’ engagements with Xi, and the revival of China-Japan-South Korea talks.
While these interactions would concern India, they could simultaneously suggest to New Delhi that Beijing might be ready for a rethink too—since the United States rather than India is China’s primary rival. The Modi government might want to test whether Beijing, under pressure from Washington and facing economic headwinds, could seek to ease tensions on its India front and stall the deepening of India’s ties with China’s rivals.
A fourth reason might be the desire in some quarters in India for economic reengagement with China. The debate within government on this between the security-firsters and the economy-firsters is not new. Yet a new element is the assessment that India will need certain imports from China to become a manufacturing hub—and part of global supply chains or China-plus-one/diversification strategies. Some constituencies outside government have also advocated for easing imports and investment restrictions. And some Indian corporations are keen to strike deals with Chinese companies in the telecommunications, retail, and electric vehicles.
Finally, some officials and analysts might press for a rethink in China due to their scepticism of the United States and concern about New Delhi getting too close to Washington. They might believe that a better equation with China would alleviate the need for alignment with the United States and other Western partners. A milder version of this motive would be outreach to China, reminding India’s Western friends that the Modi government has options and should not be taken for granted.
The Improbability of a Strategic Shift
The extent and outcome of such an Indian exploration with China is uncertain. There was similar speculation in spring-summer 2023 about a breakthrough, but it did not materialise.
Even a tactical thaw wouldn’t be easy, as one or both sides would need to budge from their conflicting positions. India’s stance has been “border before broader,” i.e., broader ties could not return to normal if the border remained “abnormal.” China’s stance has been “broader before border”—reflected in the new Chinese ambassador’s insistence that “the boundary question is not the entirety of the relationship.”
A thaw could also be dangerous for New Delhi. Any asks from Beijing that curb India’s balancing efforts—building its domestic capacities and foreign partnerships—would be strategically risky. They could take advantage of China, which has greater capabilities, without guaranteeing that Beijing will respect its commitments.
There is also some political risk. The Modi government has dismissed opposition accusations that it has accepted Chinese gains and a new normal at the border. However, domestic critics will continue to scrutinise any claims of a “return to peace and tranquillity” (the government’s stated metric) and whether concessions are made in the search for stability. There might also be some backlash from labour and/or sections of Indian business from easing economic restrictions on China, given concerns about Chinese overcapacity, among other issues.
Thus, India is unlikely to ease its efforts to compete with and deter China, especially by strengthening its capabilities and partnerships. Moreover, Modi will not want Beijing to believe he is weaker after the Indian election.
So, could there be an Indian effort to see whether a more stable dynamic with China is possible? Yes. Modi could try—as he did in 2014, 2018 and 2019. But his government is bound to embark on any such outreach while considering the limits of those previous initiatives and with the understanding that there has been little let up in Sino-Indian competition across several domains.
