During the Kargil war in 1999, by mid-June, India had captured Tololing mountain feature, visible right behind the Drass War Memorial. After this victory, the Indian Commanders became hopeful for the first time that the Pakistani soldiers could be dislodged from their strongholds, whatever be the odds. The Plan B, which could have led to another front being opened by India in Punjab, or Rajasthan, was put on hold. For the time being at least.
“By late June, the situation was deteriorating fast. The two parties were engaged in an intense conflict along the Kargil front. The danger was that the Indians would grow weary of attacking uphill into well dug-in Pakistani positions. New Delhi could easily decide to open another front along the LOC to ease its burden and force the Pakistanis to fight on territory favourable to India,’’ US diplomat Bruce Riedel wrote later.
“(Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz) Sharif became increasingly desperate as he saw how isolated Pakistan was in the world. … He urgently requested American intervention to stop the Indian counterattack. Washington was clear — the solution required a Pakistani withdrawal behind the LOC, nothing else would do. In the last days of June, Sharif began to ask to see President Clinton directly to plead his case,” Riedel wrote.
Recalling those tense days, Riedel recalled: “On July 2, the Prime Minister (Nawaz Sharif) put in a call to the President (Bill Clinton). He appealed for American intervention immediately to stop the fighting and to resolve the Kashmir issue. The President was very clear — he would help only if Pakistan withdrew to the LOC. The President consulted with Indian Prime Minister (Atal Behari) Vajpayee on the phone. The Indians were adamant — withdrawal to the LOC was essential, Vajpayee would not negotiate under the threat of aggression.”
On the July 3, Sharif was more desperate and told President Clinton he was ready to come immediately to Washington. The President repeated his caution — come only if you are ready to withdraw, I can’t help you if you are not ready to pull back. He urged Sharif to consider carefully the wisdom of a trip to Washington. Sharif said he would be there on the 4th.
Sharif’s intentions also became clearer by then to the Americans. He was bringing his wife and children with him to Washington, a possible indication that he was afraid he might not be able to go back to Pakistan if the summit failed or that the military was telling him to leave, Riedel wrote.
On July 4, 1999, Sharif reached Washington uninvited and at a time when the US was celebrating its Independence Day. Incidentally, on this day in 1776, the Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence. This is no ordinary day in the US and Clinton was in no mood (and the position) to help Sharif in any way.
Clinton had been told in no uncertain terms by Vajpayee that total withdrawal of all Pakistani troops behind the Line of Control (LoC) was the only possible starting point. The war raging along a 150-km long line in Kargil could end only after total Pakistani withdrawal and this was non-negotiable, the US had been told.
A year earlier, in May 1998, India had tested nuclear weapons and Riedel wrote about them too in his articles. “Since the surprise Indian tests in May 1998, the danger of a nuclear exchange had dominated American nightmares about South Asia. Clinton had spent days trying to argue Sharif out of testing in response and had offered him everything from a State dinner to billions in new US assistance. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Central Command chief General Tony Zinni, Assistant Secretary for South Asia Rick Inderfurth and I had travelled to Islamabad to try to persuade him, but all to no avail,” Riedel recalled.
The July 4 meeting between Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif and US President Clinton led to the former declaring that Pakistan will withdraw its forces from all held positions behind the LoC. If Sharif was looking desperately for a face-saver, Clinton could provide him none. In fact, it has been recorded in most official accounts that Clinton lost his cool with Sharif when they met. Sharif’s long journey from Islamabad to Washington thus ended in disappointment for him.
