US Spanner in China?s Tibetan Works

 

The over 5000-word Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 (TPSA) signed into law by the departing US President Donald Trump has made things more difficult for China. It will buoy the morale of the Tibetans who are worried about their future. With this, the US has effectively challenged any role for Communist China in the selection of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation andcrossed what Beijing has claimed to be its ‘red line’. The TPSA was passed with bipartisan support and the new US administration led by Joe Biden that takes over on January 20, is very unlikely to rescind it.

 

The TPSA undoes decades-long efforts by Beijing to eliminate the Dalai Lama’s influence in Tibet, Sinicise Tibetan Buddhism and fully assimilate Tibetans into the national mainstream.It acknowledges the absolute authority of the current Dalai Lama and Tibetans to select the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, thereby rebuffing China’s insistence that it has the authority to approve the selection of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. Beijing has made efforts to consolidate its claim on such a role. In addition to citing historical records, China’s State Religious Affairs Bureau sought to institutionalise it through an order in 2007. To further tighten control over the process, the Bureau was brought directly under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control in 2018 after the 19th Party Congress.

 

By urging the Chinese government to resume talks with the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoys as well as the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) in Dharamshala, the TPSA has implicitly enhanced the CTA’s role and acknowledged it as representing and reflecting the aspirations of the Tibetan diaspora around the world. This was endorsed by the recent publicised and first-ever visit by the Sikyong to the White House. The stage appears set for the CTA to play a role over the longer term.

 

China has long worried about the restive Tibetan population inside China and that hostile powers could instigate the Tibetan diaspora in its neighbourhood to fan instability in China. It made this clear during the initial phase of its interaction with Nepal and with its extreme reaction to the Dalai Lama’s visit to Mongolia in 2017. The TPSA coincides with the sharp deterioration in China’s relations with the US, growing serious strain in relations with India, and increased restiveness among China’s ethnic minority populations in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. The Tibetan diaspora has also voted this month to elect a new Sikyong (leader) to lead the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) and the TPSA affords the process set in motion by the 14th Dalai Lama and the CTA long-term support. The current electoral process will be completed in April. With its apprehensions heightened, China will be more vigilant on its borders and increase pressure on Nepal and Mongolia.

 

The unrest in China’s border provinces of Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia is unlikely to subside any time soon. Ithas been provoked by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s concept of Zhonghua Minzu – often translated as “Chinese Nation” – which is central to his “China Dream”. At the Central Ethnic Work Conference in 2014 and later at the Seventh Tibet Work Forum in August 2020, Xi Jinping insisted that “cultural identity is the foundation and long-term basis for strengthening the great unity of the Chinese nation”. Since a common language is considered essential to binding the nation, the CCP has emphasised replacing ethnic languages like Tibetan, etc., with Mandarin.

 

The Tibet Autonomous Region authorities have unsuccessfully launched successive campaigns over the past years to neutralise the 14th Dalai Lama’s influence over Tibetans. Curbs have been imposed on preaching and travel by Tibetan Buddhist monks and since early last year there has been renewed emphasis on the need for sustained opposition against “separatist activities of the Dalai Lama and the Dalai Clique” and safeguarding national unity. Propaganda by TAR authorities particularly since last August to dilute the Dalai Lama’s influence among Tibetans and especially among Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns has increased. Monks and nuns are being exhorted to adapt Tibetan Buddhism to ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ and adhere to the provisions for recognising the ‘Reincarnation of Living Buddhas’. Emphasised, too, are the study of Xi Jinping’s “strategic exposition” of governing and stabilising Tibet’s borders and that “the practice of Tibetan Buddhism should obey the rules of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to ensure stability in the region and unity among different ethnic groups”.

 

 

China will probably be faced with the situation of “two Dalai Lamas”, something they have been trying hard to avoid. The coming period will be difficult for China as Tibetans have, after all, not yet accepted Gyaltsen Norbu as their Panchen Lama. India will have a crucial role during this period when Tibet remains restive. In addition to continuing to accept the religious traditions of Tibetans, it is important for India to regain its stature as the centre of Buddhism.