Indo-US relationship saw a significant breakthrough in counter-terror cooperation when the US designated Pakistan-backed The Resistance Force(TRF) as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). While this is a diplomatic win and pushes Pakistan further into a corner on terror-sponsoring activities, for Pakistan, it will be business as usual, as a strategic look into this development suggests that for India, it is a tactical victory and the real win lies in winning the ground. As the pattern indicates, that designation did little to deter Pakistan from actual counter-terror efforts in J&K.
Little Deterrence
US Designations of Pakistan terror outfits create a strong case for India to fight a diplomatic battle against Pakistan in International forums, especially influence listing in FATF. However, as transactional diplomacy takes centre stage in the global order, these diplomatic manoeuvres now hold little deterrent value. The Indian Mujahideen (IM) is a terror group that was formed by reorganising/re-adjusting the dwindling SIMI cadre. The group was a nightmare for the Indian security landscape as IM’s operational behaviour was of maximum terror with minimum identification.
The IM’s designation came in September 2011, two months after the July 13 Mumbai serial bomb blasts. But did it deter IM from striking Indian cities? No, IM continued to strike multiple Indian cities with limited intensity, but the element of psychological fear and attempt to do maximum terror with minimum identification was there. Three cases of limited intensity bombing were conducted by IM in eight months in 2013, from the Hyderabad twin blasts to the Patna blasts, resulting in 24 fatalities and around 190 injuries. Similarly, Lashkar e Taiba(LeT) was designated as FTO in December 2001, but carried out a deadly attack on Akshardham Temple after almost 9 months and the 2003 Mumbai serial blasts. Two years after its designation, LeT had attempted to demonstrate high operational continuity with maximum terror.
Limitations of Designation
US Designation as FTO has a strong impact against weak terror outfits like Indian Mujahideen, which collapsed in 2013 through India’s strong counter-terror response, but for strong terror outfits, the impact remains limited, where outfits like LeT and Jaish manage to survive and show operational resilience. The US itself faced serious threats and attacks after the designation. The classic case of Al-Qaeda’s operational resilience after designation is worth observing, which exposed the US’s designation limitations. The terror outfit was designated as an FTO in October 1999, but the world witnessed one of the deadliest terror attacks of the decade- the 9/11 attacks. Al-Qaeda conducted these attacks in less than two years after the FTO designation, and after the September 11 attacks, Al-Qaeda continued with small-scale attacks for operational continuity (USS Cole suicide bombing in October 2000 targeting a US Navy destroyer in Yemen by AQAP. Another deadly attack on US citizens came within two years of 9/11 in Saudi Arabia- the Riyadh Compound bombing in 2003. Similarly, Al-Qaeda in Iraq(AQI), precursor to ISIS, carried out deadly suicide bombings at three hotels in Iraq, specifically targeting Westerners and US citizens. The attack came almost within a year of designation as FTO in December 2004.
The key reason why the US designation’s impact is limited is in its objective; the designation aims to disrupt, not dismantle, which can only be seen in success in weak outfits that can collapse with disruptive actions. However, strong terror outfits endure their impact due to three key reasons.
First- Safe Heavens with weak governance and porous borders, like African regions, and in the early 2000s, Afghanistan. These safe havens provide physical bases for planning, training, and recruitment, making FTO designations ineffective without local government cooperation, as without host country involvement on the ground, FTO sanctions or counter-terror actions cannot effectively disrupt a terror outfit. Al-Qaeda moved to the tribal areas of Pakistan after 9/11 to remain off the radar of US military operations, and LeT, with ISI support, went off the radar after the 2008 attacks.
Second- Decentralised operation with minimum identification- using tight cell-based operations and using front organisations to bypass FTO sanctions helps to maintain operational continuity- LeT used Indian Mujahideen and TRF, and Al-Qaeda used Al-Queda in Arabian Peninsula(AQAP) and AQI. The decentralised and cell-based terror network, which helps to build multiple offshoots, helps terror organisations to maintain operational strength even if their leadership gets targeted by arrests or sanctions.
Third- Alternative Sources of Funding: Hawala network, donors at front organisations circumvent asset freezing and funding disruption by FTO designation. After the Al-Qaeda designation, the terror outfit heavily relied on hawala networks and Gulf-based donors to fund the 9/11 attacks. Similarly, LeT relied upon JuD’s charitable activities backed by ISI, which helped LeT to operationally sustain itself, which eventually led to the 2008 attacks despite asset freezing after FTO designation by the US in 2001. Some non-traditional funding sources are immune to the US’s banking sanctions, allowing terror organisations to procure arms and explosives and send them to save heavens for training through various cross-border networks.
Grounded Counter Terror Strategies
When designation failed to give desirable outputs, the US combined strong counterterror strategies by not aiming for disruption but aiming for dismantling terror groups by a multi-dimensional counterterror strategy involving a network-centric approach by targeted strikes and strong Intelligence work. Targeted strikes help in eliminating leadership, and strong intelligence work helps to track money flows, front organisations and decentralised terror cells.
Collapse of the Indian Mujahideen
Serious intelligence-driven network-centric operations led to major successes in India’s counter-terror landscape that first began with the collapse of the IM network. India’s consistent network-centric operations with close coordination with the US highlight a multi-spectre counter strategy in play. All this combination of strategies led identification of front organisations for IM in Gulf countries that were frozen under FTO, leading to the crippling of IM’s financial network. Further, some serious intelligence work in network-centric operations led to the capture of IM’s leader, Yasin Bhatkal and a key operative of IM linked to financial funding, Abdul Wahid Siddibapa, in 2012. Later, IM’s Azamgarh and Pune modules were also dismantled in 2014 with arrests of key IM operatives.
Coordinated and assertive counter-terror strategy led to the successful dismantlement of the Indian Mujahideen by 2017. IM collapse was an operational success, which can help in setting the stage for dismantling the Resistance Group in J&K.
TRF and IM: Learning right lessons
There is a key operational similarity between LeT’s IM and now growing TRF is maximum terror with minimal identification, with only a slight difference, the former overtly and aggressively executes attacks through bombings, but TRF depends more on covert work and sets a limited operational base and targets with maximum terror impact. The recruitment approach is also quite the same- radicalisation young muslims by exploiting local grievances, communal colouring and political approaches. TRF has intensified this through propaganda via limited tech capabilities, focusing on Kashmiri youth. As far as the operational security of these organisations is concerned, both have demonstrated operating in a tight, decentralised cell network. The only difference is operational advancement and method of engagement, which is direct but sophisticated in TRF’s case. The difficulty in establishing a strong and grounded counter-terror strategy against TRF is not at the operational level but at the tactical level.
First: The network-centric operations are not able to penetrate in tight cell-based network of TRF, perhaps due to weak intelligence on the ground.
Second: operational pattern, which is facilitated and sometimes executed by overground workers and fresh recruits/unlisted individuals who are not on the radar of agencies.
Third: Quick tactical adaptability: Tight communication interface through secure encryption and tying up strategy to exhaust and distract forces with high-end weaponry and body cameras show that the outfit focuses not only on sustenance but on advancement as well.
However, these gaps can be filled if the right operational readjustments are done on the ground by moving to advanced network-centric operations involving some serious intelligence work on the ground through: data(fusion of intelligence from HUMINT to OSINT), cross-domain integration(drone, cyber and satellites). These advanced network-centric operations (ANCO) must be combined with a multi-spectre counter-terror strategy by staging targeted and search-and-destroy operations on the ground, leveraging ANCO and the US’s counter-terror cooperation to cripple TRF’s funding and arms network through front organisations and hawala, as it did with IM. Right fusion of counter terror strategy can help rewrite India’s counter terror success landscape, but to make this happen, some serious operational and Intelligence work is expected by top echelons in New Delhi and J&K.
