The recent interest of Chinese officials in the Lalmonirhat airbase, a World War II-era facility located in Bangladesh near the India-Bangladesh border, has raised significant strategic concerns for India. Positioned just 12-15 kilometres from the Indian border and approximately 135 kilometres from the Siliguri Corridor—often referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck” due to its narrow, 22-kilometre width connecting India’s northeastern states to the mainland—this development has sparked debates about China’s intentions in the region. The airbase, controlled by the Bangladesh Air Force but largely inactive for decades, is now at the centre of a proposal by Bangladesh’s interim administration, led by Mohammed Yunus, to revive it along with five other British-era airports.
Historical Context of Lalmonirhat Airbase
The Lalmonirhat airbase, constructed in 1931 by the British colonial government, served as a critical military facility during World War II. It functioned as a forward airbase for Allied forces operating on the eastern front against Japanese forces. Spanning 1,166 acres, the airbase features a 4-kilometre runway and a large tarmac, making it a significant infrastructural asset despite its prolonged inactivity.
Following the Partition of India in 1947, the airbase came under Pakistani control and was briefly reopened in 1958 for civilian use. However, it was largely abandoned thereafter. In 2019, during the tenure of former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, a portion of the airbase was allocated to establish the Bangladesh Aerospace and Aviation University, which now operates under the Bangladesh Air Force. Despite this development, the airbase’s military and strategic potential remained underutilised until recent proposals for its revival.
Mohammed Yunus’ Proposal and Chinese Involvement
In a significant policy shift, Bangladesh’s interim administration, led by Mohammed Yunus, has proposed revitalising Lalmonirhat and five other British-era airports—namely Ishwardi, Thakurgaon, Shamshernagar, Comilla, and Bogra—to stimulate economic growth. This proposal gained traction following Yunus’ visit to China in April 2025, during which he reportedly discussed infrastructure development with Chinese officials. Yunus’ remarks during the visit, stating that “Bangladesh is the only guardian of the ocean for the entire region including the northeast of India,” have been perceived as controversial, particularly in New Delhi, given the strategic sensitivity of the region.
Reports indicate that Chinese officials have visited the Lalmonirhat airbase, raising concerns about Beijing’s intentions. While the exact purpose of their presence remains unclear, the proximity of the airbase to the Siliguri Corridor amplifies India’s strategic vulnerabilities. The corridor is a critical lifeline for India, connecting its eight northeastern states—Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, and Sikkim—to the mainland. Any foreign presence, particularly from China, in such close proximity could pose significant security challenges.
Strategic Implications for India’s Northeast
The Siliguri Corridor’s strategic importance cannot be overstated. As a narrow strip of land, it is highly vulnerable to disruptions that could sever India’s access to its northeastern states.
Sriparna Pathak, a professor of China Studies quoted in a Times of India report, highlighted the risks, stating, “This could enable Chinese to keep an eye on Indian military movements or gather intelligence near the Siliguri Corridor.” Such activities could undermine India’s ability to maintain operational secrecy and mobility in the region, particularly in the context of ongoing border tensions with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
Kalpit Mankikar, a fellow of China-Taiwan Studies at the Observer Research Foundation quoted in The Times of India report, further elaborated on the potential threat: “One thing is China has definite plans for that region. All this while those plans may have been dormant because [deposed Bangladesh PM] Sheikh Hasina was more accommodating towards India’s interests. Now, with the regime change and Mohammed Yunus’ open offer that Bangladesh can serve as a fountainhead against India, China would definitely be tempted to take up the offer”.
Mankikar added, “We don’t know yet what are China’s plans for the project. But this could be used to monitor civilian and military movement to Northeast from the rest of India and vice versa” (The Times of India).
The potential destabilisation of the Siliguri Corridor could have far-reaching consequences, not only for India’s territorial integrity but also for its economic and political stability in the Northeast, a region already grappling with ethnic and insurgent challenges.
China’s Broader Interests in Bangladesh
China’s engagement with Bangladesh extends beyond the Lalmonirhat airbase. Beijing has been actively pursuing economic and military projects in the country, positioning itself as a key partner in Bangladesh’s development.
Chinese companies are reportedly constructing factories and a solar power plant near Rangpur and planning a satellite city. A Dhaka-based journalist, who spoke anonymously to The Times of India, noted that “these factories are operated almost entirely by Chinese personnel, with not much involvement from local workers,” raising questions about the extent of local economic benefits.
Militarily, China is a major supplier of equipment to the Bangladesh armed forces, and deepening defence ties between Dhaka and Beijing have been a growing concern for India. The shift in Bangladesh’s political landscape following the ousting of Sheikh Hasina, who maintained a balanced relationship with India, has created opportunities for China to expand its influence. The proposed revival of the Lalmonirhat airbase, potentially with Chinese funding or technical assistance, could serve as a dual-purpose project, enabling both economic development and strategic surveillance.
Pakistan’s Role and Regional Dynamics
Adding another layer of complexity, reports suggest that a Pakistani company may be engaged as a subcontractor for the Lalmonirhat airbase project, with work expected to commence in October 2025. Prior to the Chinese visits, a Pakistani military-intelligence delegation reportedly inspected border areas in Bangladesh, raising suspicions about coordinated efforts between China and Pakistan to counterbalance India’s influence in the region.
Historically, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) maintained close ties with separatist groups in India’s Northeast, many of which operated from Bangladeshi soil until a crackdown by the Awami League government in 2009. The potential involvement of Pakistani entities in the airbase project has heightened India’s concerns about the revival of such networks, particularly in the context of a less India-friendly administration in Dhaka.
Indian defence officials have expressed cautious vigilance, stating, “We need to see if Bangladesh will allow other countries like China and Pakistan to use it. Bangladesh has the right to develop air fields for their security reasons, but that should not be used against India” (Assam Tribune). The ambiguity surrounding the airbase’s intended use whether for civilian, training, or military purposes, underscores the need for close monitoring by Indian agencies.
The revival of the Lalmonirhat airbase, coupled with Chinese and potential Pakistani involvement, represents a significant challenge to India’s strategic interests in the Northeast. The airbase’s proximity to the Siliguri Corridor amplifies its importance, as any foreign presence could disrupt India’s access to a geopolitically sensitive region. While Bangladesh has the sovereign right to develop its infrastructure, the involvement of external powers with competing interests necessitates a cautious and proactive response from India.
Importance of Chicken’s Neck for India
The Siliguri Corridor is crucial for domestic and international trade, handling one million vehicles daily—trucks, buses, SUVs, cars, and two-wheelers—moving 2,400 metric tonnes of goods and generating Rs142 crore in revenue. It also hosts vital oil, gas, and electricity infrastructure. Without this corridor, trade in eastern Indian products like Darjeeling tea and timber would face severe disruptions.
Linking Bihar and Sikkim to India’s north-eastern states, the corridor borders Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. Just 130 km north lies China-controlled Tibet’s Chumbi Valley, where China’s military buildup, including roads and airstrips, escalates regional tensions.
China seeks to secure strategic dominance over the Siliguri Corridor by enhancing its military presence in the Chumbi Valley, enabling rapid mobilisation near the vulnerable “Chicken’s Neck.” Ongoing border disputes, rooted in the 1962 Sino-India war over areas like Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, fuel tensions. The 2017 Doklam standoff exposed the corridor’s fragility, prompting India to strengthen its defences. The corridor’s single railway line, a critical supply route, remains a potential target in conflicts.
Bhutan’s Role in the Dispute
Positioned north of the Siliguri Corridor, Bhutan plays a pivotal role in regional security. The Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty ties Bhutan’s security to India’s, treating threats to Bhutan as threats to India, fostering close military cooperation and bolstering India’s stance in the corridor. China’s recent establishment of military bases in four disputed Bhutanese territories, seen as illegal encroachments, escalates tensions and challenges Bhutan’s sovereignty, with direct implications for India. China’s tactics, including promoting migration to contested areas and offering economic incentives via the Belt and Road Initiative, raise concerns about debt-trap diplomacy. Bhutan navigates a delicate balance between China and India, but its security remains heavily reliant on Indian support.
