Reforms in the Defence Services have been long overdue to meet the new challenges. Now, the reforms would not only help speed up modernisation, but also sharpen the tooth-to-tail ratio
Maj Gen (Retd) Dhruv C Katoch
In May 2016, the then Raksha Mantri, Shri Manohar Parrikar
constituted a Committee under Lt Gen.(retd) D. B. Shekatkar to recommend measures to enhance combat capability and re-balance defence expenditure of the Armed Forces with an aim to increase “teeth to tail ratio” of the forces. The Shekatkar Committee, as it was called, submitted its report to the Ministry of Defence in December 2016. Shri Parrikar left in March 2017 to take over as the CM of Goa and Shri Arun Jaitley assumed additional charge of Defence. Under him, the recommendations were partly approved in August 2017, with the MoD giving out the broad contours of what had been planned. The MoD statement read: “In a first ever exercise after Independence, the Ministry of Defence in consultation with the Indian Army, has decided to reform the Indian Army in a planned manner. These decisions were approved by the Defence Minister.” The statement went on to say that in the first phase, reforms would involve redeployment and restructuring of approximately 57,000 posts of officers, junior commissioned officers and other ranks and civilians. It further stated that optimisation of signals establishments, closure of military farms and army postal establishments in peace locations as well as the restructuring of repair echelons in the army, including base workshops, will also be part of the extensive exercise.
Restructuring the Army
The restructuring would include redeployment of ordnance echelons to include vehicle depots, ordnance depots and central ordnance depots apart from streamlining inventory control mechanisms. The reforms would also be carried out to ensure better utilisation of supply and transport facilities and animal transport units. In addition, there would be an enhancement in standards of recruitment of clerical staff and drivers in the Army as also improving the efficiency of the National Cadet Corps. The Committee had suggested 99 recommendations for structural changes in the Army, out of which the Defence Ministry has accepted 65 after consultations with all the stakeholders. The Implementation of the Shekatkar Committee report has begun with the decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security to close 39 military farms in a time- bound manner.
This is indeed an important move to restructure the Army. The administrative component of the Army was a legacy of the British. However, with increasing digitisation of the Force, improved industrial capability within the country and rapid strides in communication technology necessitate a review of the methodology of providing administrative support to the Field Force. Earlier, in April this year, the issue of enhancing the Army’s overall strike capability had been deliberated upon in the Army Commanders’ conference, which means that a broad consensus exists for reforms within the Army.
Redeploying 57000 personnel for combat duties is unlikely to
significantly impact upon the teeth-to- tail ratio. Doing away with military farms, postal services and base
workshops and reducing manpower in the Remount and Veterinary Corps (RVC) is a positive step, but most of those laid off will be civilian non- combatants who cannot be assigned combat roles. The saving on their establishment costs would need to be redirected towards meeting the outsourcing costs because such services cannot be dispensed with. There would be some savings through ‘optimising” non-combat support arms—Army Service Corps (ASC), Army Ordnance Corps (AOC) and Electronics and Mechanical Engineers (EME). This would be marginal. In future, the Army would need to restructure these Services to form a composite logistics service rather than individual services to carry out these functions.
Manpower Intensive
The Army is invariably seen as a manpower heavy organisation fit for cutting ‘flab’, and therefore, the defence expenditure, especially the revenue expenditure. It is not well appreciated that the Army, by the very nature of its role, has to be a manpower intensive organisation, considering the nature of its employment on the borders with China and Pakistan and its continuing
commitments in countering terrorism and insurgency. No technology can replace the manpower required for these tasks. The Navy and the Air Force, on the other hand, are
equipment and technology-intensive organisations operating from well-established and compact bases with no commitment or employment in underdeveloped areas with extreme terrain and climatic conditions, where supporting a combatant at the cutting edge may at times need more support troops than the combatant itself. Siachen is a pertinent example. A more pertinent reform would be in the defence support establishments like Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Director General Defence Estates, Director General Quality Assurance (DGQA), Ordnance Factory Board, Ordnance Factories, Defence Public Sector Undertakings and so on. Expenditure incurred on these organisations also forms part of the defence expenditure, but there is little accountability. The investment in these set-ups and the ‘teeth’ provided by them merit intense scrutiny. Interestingly, defence civilians account for 40 percent of the defence pension budget. The recommendations of the committee on these structures is unlikely to see implementation.
Another area where reforms are required is in the Ministry of Defence itself. It comprises solely of civilians, with very limited knowledge of matters military. India, perhaps, is the only
country in the world which has a Ministry of Defence devoid of military officers. Most modern democracies have half if not more of their personnel in the ministry from the military. India has none. This is a structural flaw which has never been rectified due to government apathy. Briefly put, the MoD has ‘full control without accountability or responsibility’. Ideally, the MoD should have a mix of military and civilians working together in a cohesive manner, to meet demands of national security. This is resisted by the bureaucracy, which continues to retain a vice like a grip on the Armed Forces. Integration of the MoD, by bringing in uniformed personnel in the
decision-making process is a long overdue reform, but one that is unlikely to come about in the near future. However, reforms in the in the management of defence at the apex level is necessary, if meaningful reforms in the Armed Forces are to come about. While a good beginning has been
made in putting up some of the recommendations of the Shekatkar Committee for implementation, much more is required to be done. The new Raksha Mantri, Smt Nirmala Sitharaman indeed has a most challenging task in front of her.
(The writer is a Director, India Foundation )
