On October 31, 2025, India and the United States formalised a new ten-year defence framework — the Framework for the US‑India Major Defence Partnership. Signalling that despite intermittent friction in their broader relations, the strategic partnership remains robust and forward-looking. For India, this pact is less a rhetorical gesture than a clear acknowledgement of its rising status and of the mutual benefits of deeper defence ties. The deal underlines Delhi’s intent to leverage its geostrategic position, bolster its defence-industrial base and strengthen its role in a rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific environment.
The agreement, signed by India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and U.S. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in Kuala Lumpur, replaces and upgrades the earlier 2015 defence framework. The new pact explicitly seeks cooperation “across all domains – land, air, sea, space and cyberspace”, embraces defence-industry collaboration and interoperability and emphasises maritime domain awareness and joint logistics.
From India’s perspective, several factors make the timing and scope of this pact particularly significant. First, Delhi finds itself navigating a tougher regional security environment with continuing threats on its northern and western borders. A framework that deepens defence cooperation with the U.S. gives India access to advanced technology, enhanced intelligence and maritime networking opportunities in managing security challenges. The U.S. has already approved major sales – for example the multi-billion dollar contract for 31 MQ-9B drones.
Second, the pact aligns with India’s ambition of defence-industrial transformation. Under the headline framework, sits the growing collaboration in co-production, R&D and technology transfer – for instance manufacturing jet engines (GE F404/F414) in India, leveraging the INDUS-X mechanism and building a more diversified equipment base. By signing a long-term defence pact, India signals to global industry that it is committed and stable as a partner, thereby strengthening its “Make in India – defence” narrative.
Third, this pact shows resilience in the face of temporary diplomatic and trade tensions. Earlier in 2025, the US had imposed steep tariffs on Indian exports – up to 50 per cent – as New Delhi faced pressure for its Russian oil imports. Yet, the defence channel between India and the U.S. remained largely insulated from the fallout. Indian analysts highlight that while economic and trade disagreements can flare, defence cooperation has built strong institutional momentum over years – from foundational pacts (LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA) to recurring joint exercises (for example, Yudh Abhyas). This demonstrates that India does not view the derailment of one dimension (trade) as a reason to pause another (strategic defence). In that sense, the new agreement conveys Delhi’s message: ties may strain, but strategic partnerships endure.
India stands to benefit from this pact in tangible ways. Enhanced maritime domain awareness and logistics linkages strengthen India’s role across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and in the broader Indo-Pacific. Given that the pact explicitly mentions a “free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific”, India is better placed to assert its vision as a regional security provider rather than merely a recipient of external security guarantees. Secondly, by deepening interoperability with U.S. forces and defence industry, India reduces some of the risks of overdependence on any one supplier and builds a more independent defence posture. Thirdly, the strategic signalling value is high: partnering with the U.S. over a decade sends a strong message to regional actors (and competitors) alike about India’s strategic weight and the seriousness with which it is crafting its foreign and defence policy.
Looking ahead, the trajectory of India-U.S. relations under this pact is likely two-fold. On the defence-security front, we can expect more frequent and complex joint exercises, deeper intelligence sharing, maritime cooperation (including in the Indian Ocean and possibly West Indian Ocean littoral), and expanded defence-industry tie-ups. The ten-year horizon provides the temporal space for co-production and R&D agreements to mature rather than be limited to off-the-shelf procurement. On the diplomatic-economic front, the pact provides a stabilising anchor: even if trade or energy issues generate friction, the underlying defence architecture gives both sides a reason to maintain dialogue and coordination. The resilience exhibited in concluding this deal amid tariff tensions reinforces that function.
However, India also retains autonomy in how it operationalises this relationship. The pact does not mean alignment in every foreign policy domain; India will continue its multi-vector approach – engaging Russia, maintaining its strategic autonomy and catering to national priorities. Indeed analysts note that while the defence tie-up with the U.S. deepens, India continues to procure Russian systems and balance its diplomatic engagements accordingly. In practical terms, India must ensure that co-production commitments do not remain mere announcements and that technology transfer is meaningful rather than symbolic. For Delhi, the next challenge will be leveraging this framework in creating a domestic defence innovation ecosystem that generates indigenous capability, not just assembly lines.
From India’s vantage point, the new decade-long defence pact is a strategic investment. It underscores that despite episodic discord, the India-U.S. strategic relationship has matured beyond ad-hoc deals to institutionalised partnership. Delhi benefits by gaining strengthened capability, diplomatic leverage and industrial impetus; at the same time, it preserves its freedom of action. In a world where the Indo-Pacific is increasingly contested, India now has a more robust foundation to shape outcomes rather than react to them. The defence pact may be the most visible element of this shift, but for India it signals something deeper: it is stepping into an era where it expects to be co-creator of regional security architectures, and not simply a beneficiary.
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