In the heartlands of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, where the red flags of Maoist insurgency once flew with impunity, silence now speaks louder than the gunfire that once dominated these regions. The recent neutralization of top extremists Pappu Lohra and Prabhat Ganjhu in Latehar and the dramatic takedown of Nambala Keshava Rao, alias Basavraj the most elusive Maoist leader mark pivotal victories in India’s prolonged battle against left-wing extremism. These are not mere isolated encounters. They are the defining moments of a decade-long campaign under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership a campaign that has arguably succeeded where every Indian government before him faltered.
When Modi took office in 2014, Naxalism was not just a law-and-order issue. It was India’s gravest internal security threat, with over 120 districts in the grip of violent insurgents. Maoist cadres operated as parallel governments in vast swathes of land, particularly across the “Red Corridor” stretching from Andhra Pradesh to Bihar. Villagers lived in perpetual fear. Infrastructure development was stalled. Police forces were demoralized. State legitimacy was under siege. The response from the UPA government ranged from bureaucratic inertia to confused ideological posturing, oscillating between “talks” and tactical restraint.
Modi’s doctrine, however, marked a seismic shift to a comprehensive, unrelenting strategy anchored in resolve, national will, and strategic clarity. He did not view Naxalism as a socio-economic grievance alone, nor as an insurgency that could be negotiated at the cost of the republic’s authority. Instead, Modi identified it for what it was a violent, radical, anti-democratic insurgency that must be dismantled by the full force of the Indian state.
This strategic clarity manifested in three critical ways: aggressive security operations, development-driven governance, and a robust political narrative.
First, the security response was recalibrated. Under Union Home Minister Amit Shah, anti-Naxal operations became more sophisticated, better coordinated, and more frequent. Forces like the CRPF and local police units were equipped with better arms, intelligence, and infrastructure. Joint operations such as the one recently executed in Latehar under SP Kumar Gaurav became the norm rather than the exception. Forces began to strike at the ideological and operational heart of the movement, targeting top leaders rather than reacting to their offensives. The death of Basavraj, carrying a Rs 1 crore bounty, is akin to decapitating the movement’s central nervous system.
The results speak for themselves. Naxal-affected districts have fallen from 126 in 2014 to just 38 today. Violent incidents are down by over 50 percent, civilian deaths by 86 percent, and casualties among security personnel by 77 percent. The tide has turned. In 2014, more jawans were martyred than Naxals killed; now, it is the insurgents who are on the back backfoot. These statistics do not merely reflect numbers they signify the reassertion of the Indian state in territories long abandoned to fear.
But the Modi-Shah doctrine did not stop at brute force. Recognizing that Naxalism draws sustenance from deprivation, the government launched an unprecedented development push into the heart of insurgency-affected regions. Roads carved through dense jungles have connected previously inaccessible villages. Mobile connectivity in Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) zones has skyrocketed from under 30% to over 90%, ending decades of digital isolation. Piped water, solar lights, healthcare centers, and fortified police outposts are now a reality where once only Maoist diktats held sway.
The Special Central Assistance (SCA) Scheme offering Rs 30 crore per severely affected district was a masterstroke in decentralized development. More than Rs 6,500 crore has been invested in police modernization and infrastructure. This dual strategy of bullets and bread has squeezed the insurgents from both ends: militarily through decisive operations and socially by undercutting their support base.
Equally important has been the humane approach to rehabilitation. Over 8,000 Naxals have surrendered since 2014 with more than 1,600 giving up arms in just the last 16 months. Unlike previous governments that often treated surrendered Naxals as liabilities, the Modi administration has integrated them through skill development, livelihood assistance, and community reintegration. This carrot-and-stick policy soft with the willing, ruthless with the defiant has made insurgency an unattractive proposition for the foot soldiers of the movement.
In stark contrast, the UPA-era policy on Naxalism was marred by ideological confusion and administrative lethargy. While lip service was paid to security action, senior leaders, including Congress functionaries, often sympathized with the “socio-economic” narrative peddled by Naxal ideologues. The most glaring example was the appointment of Binayak Sen, convicted for Maoist links, to the Planning Commission’s health panel. Such decisions not only blurred the moral line between the state and insurgents but also weakened the resolve of security forces.
Under Modi, that line is crystal clear. The state will no longer retreat. It will no longer negotiate from a position of weakness. This clarity has emboldened law enforcement and instilled confidence in citizens long trapped between state neglect and Maoist brutality.
To be clear, challenges remain. Pockets of resistance in dense forest belts and border zones continue to witness skirmishes. Ideological indoctrination of youth in some tribal belts is still a concern. But the larger battle has shifted irreversibly in favor of the state. What was once a battle for survival is now a mission of restoration of governance, of rights, of security, and of dignity.
Looking ahead, Modi’s target of a Naxal-free India by 2026 no longer sounds like political rhetoric. It is a plausible goal, rooted in a decade of relentless action. And when it is eventually achieved, history will rightly credit Modi for doing what no Indian leader before him could break the spine of India’s most violent internal insurgency not through half-measures, but through conviction, clarity, and courage.
In conclusion, the Modi-Shah doctrine on Naxalism will be remembered not just as a successful counter-insurgency model but as a reassertion of the Indian Republic’s moral and constitutional authority. Where guns once ruled, governance now walks. Where fear once lived, freedom now breathes. That is the real victory and one India must never take for granted.
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