Following over four years of border tensions with China, the Narendra Modi administration has successfully negotiated significant agreements aimed at reinstating ‘patrolling rights’ for the Indian military in the Eastern Ladakh area. This development aligns closely with the conditions that existed prior to the Galwan incident (July 2020) at the border. China has shown an inclination towards achieving stability along its border with India, particularly in light of India’s clear stance on the border dispute and the evolving geopolitical landscape that necessitates these adjustments. The recent bilateral discussions held in Kazan, Russia, on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit 2024, indicate a heightened ‘sense of realism’ in the evaluation of bilateral relations from both parties. Since 2020, India-China relations have been in a state of uncertainty and minimal diplomatic engagement.
The recent development on the border issue is being recognised as a significant advancement in resolving the four-year military standoff between the two Asian nuclear powers. However, the agreement to pursue de-escalation between India and China must be viewed within the broader context ‘strategic assessment’ and not just in any kind of isolation. The changes in the border situation cannot merely be regarded as the result of some unforeseen circumstances. Instead, the reached agreement is the outcome of four years of persistent diplomatic, political, and military negotiations conducted by both nations. The border clash in July 2020, initiated by China’s People’s Liberation Army, stemmed from a ‘lack of foresight and miscalculations’ on the part of Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Firstly and more importantly, the agreement is the result of prolonged political, military, and diplomatic negotiations, which included 31 rounds of meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on border matters between the two countries. This new framework of agreements reflects a “political will” from both sides and their leadership to mend a relationship that has encountered a “low point” in the aftermath of the Galwan clashes. Given the current uncertainties in the global order and the evolving geopolitical landscape in the region, this move is both timely and a positive advancement.
It is clearly evident that India’s strategy of maintaining ‘strategic patience’ with China has been beneficial, ensuring the security of our interests in border areas while enhancing our perspective on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Contrary to what the critics claim, such restraint and ‘strategic patience’ do make India look mature enough not to take Beijing’s bait.
Secondly, in a wider context of global geopolitics, this development also creates diplomatic opportunities for Delhi as it endeavours to navigate a balance between Russia and Western nations. Furthermore, with the US presidential elections approaching in less than two weeks, it provides Delhi with additional leverage as it looks forward to engaging with the incoming administration in the White House. A key factor leading up to this assessment in India’s diplomatic calculus is whether the United States (US) or any major third country can be allowed to take the leverage of abnormality in India-China relations. In addition, Chinese diplomacy is facing ‘new heat’ in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea region.
In the post-globalisation era, western countries have abducted their roles and responsibilities on major global issues, while India and China have positioned themselves as system stabilisers. At the BRICS 2024, both are driving together for alternative developmental financial mechanisms to support the developing countries in the Global South.
Thirdly, India has consistently maintained ‘peace and tranquillity at the border’ and the importance of three mutual as ‘mutual respect, mutual interest and mutual sensitivity’ key to bilateral relations. While it is true that we have to work with China now based on the new situation and set of agreements in border areas. The fact remains that India-China borders have become more live, and there has been significant increase in infrastructure build up and troops deployment. With India also, beyond this disengagement and de-escalation the questions remains about the clarity on buffer zones and future management of border areas. These are the key questions that need to be addressed in the long run.
By showing up to Chinese aggression first in Dokalm (2017) and now in Galwan (2020), India has been able to stand its ground with much firmness and clarity. Under the Modi leadership not going for rhetorical retaliation, Indian diplomacy has been firm on maintaining military resistance and strategic balancing with China.
Fourthly, in recent months, India has also considered relaxing investment restrictions on China, preferably in non-sensitive sectors. The Economic Survey of India 2024 highlighted the role of drawing Chinese investment to strengthen our Global Value Chains (GVCs). One possible approach to re-establishing a degree of normalcy in the relationship would be to facilitate necessary Chinese investment in India, preferably in non-sensitive sectors. As China faces a deceleration in its capital surplus economy, India, with its expanding economy, requires significant capital, especially in the manufacturing domain. Increased investment from China could also serve to partially address the existing ‘trade imbalance’ that is advantageous to China.
Lastly, China has not made the ‘One India Policy’ clear. There are larger questions attached to it, like sovereignty issues in the border regions. While India’s position on Tibet has mostly remained rather ‘resolute and clear’, China, since 2006, has referred to some parts of Arunachal Pradesh (AP) as Southern Tibet. Chinese side has to understand that ‘security and sovereignty are non-negotiable’ and must be implemented in letter and spirit both. The logic of ‘mind the power gap’ cannot be extended to issues that involve national unity and territorial interests for India.
In any case, the new deal on border between India and China is a welcome development and is significant also, but its importance should not be overstated in unreal terms. The agreement does give a ‘diplomatic space’ to both the leadership for further engagements and also has scope for wider political and economic engagements. However, the relationship, which suffers from ‘high trust deficit’, necessitates more balancing and deterrence with China.
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