Andaman and Nicobar Islands a maritime sentinel in the Indian Ocean strategic map

The government’s heightened plans to focus and remodel the Andaman and Nicobar islands into a genuine maritime security bastion to the east of peninsular India and a significant lynchpin for tranquillity and security in the evolving Indo-Pacific. This has a far-reaching implications to India’s Act East Policy. The realisation of the vital importance of maritime power, and the speedy transformation of the Chinese PLA navy have surfaced an imperative discussion regarding emphasis on the Indian strategic assets and territories.

The A&N Islands share four of India’s international maritime zone delimitations with countries like Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. They also provide India with substantial ocean space under UNCLOS in terms of an exclusive economic zone and create its continental clout. It is feared by the commentators that a serious challenge is at the door of India emanating from Chinese quarters.

It is inevitable to circumvent the ongoing West Asian turmoil between Israel and Iran and its proxies, which has adversely affected the Red Sea route marred with Houthi attacks. This is a harsh reminder of the maritime choke points dominated by a few and represents the vulnerabilities of the world trade and commerce in terms of over dependence of such straits and routes.

Similarly, Chinese maritime forces at the eastern points have vice-like grip on Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Ombai Wetar Straits in the Indo-Pacific region. Particularly, the Malacca Strait, from which over 90,000 ships carry approximately 30 percent of the world’s traded goods pass throughout the year presents an opportunity for India to pull the strings. It is often cited that Great Nicobar Island is an excellent location, astride western front of the Malacca Strait. India can utilise the island to even monitor the activities occurring around the region. This is one of China’s weakness as in the past Chinese Premier Hu Jintao stated his well known concerns about the Malacca Dilemma.

Meanwhile, it has been reported that expansion of military infrastructure in the island chain is augmenting which will consequently allow the establishments of advanced military platforms to settle, improve communication and surveillance arrangements and thus become a robust base for permanent deployment of troops. This recent move that aims to thrust on developing strategic infrastructure both military and civilian on the island is being well received.

This development is placating one of New Delhi’s most prolonged neglect of maritime vision since Independence. The islands were given limited access to the Indian mainland and no connection to the neighbouring South East Asian nations. The current political regime should be given the credit for finally discerning the strategic and economic importance of the A&N Islands and Lakshwadeep.

To set a brief historical context, the colonial masters had sharp and focused maritime orientation and the global connection were channelised and rooted in the naval power. Thus, the value of the island territories were consciously in their radar as one of cardinals for transoceanic commerce and fulcrum of power during the widespread of the capitalism era and rabid power contestation to monopolise markets and vying for geopolitical influence. However, India’s naive internationalism, its protectionist economic outlook, tackling the aftermath of the horrendous Partition, and China’s claim on Tibet, all of this clouded and restricted India’s vision from seeing the vast plausibilities of leveraging the ocean power despite having a long coastline and impeccable positioning of its two island chains.

Fast-forwarding to 1990s, when Indian economy underwent reforms, the bigger picture began to alter its contour towards its security landscape. Fresh perspective was needed to fortify the strategic assets in general, and the islands territories in particular, through the constituting tri-services command under the Andaman Nicobar Command (ANC) in Port Blair in 2001. However, since its inception to 2024, it proved to be grossly incapable. ANC was never given resources— military or financial. It is mostly labelled as theatrics and rhetoric to pretend to be altruistic about the protection of such invaluable maritime assets.

The recent A&N Islands development seen as a wake up call for New Delhi and becoming a centre of the geopolitical discussion. The realisation behind this is the unprecedented expansion of PLA navy and its frequent criss-crossing in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the A&N Islands would bear the brunt fore mostly if any attempt takes place to underestimate Indian maritime security preparation.

The major challenge that emerges is the pace. It has been slowed down because the previous coalition governments did not want to utilise their strategic bandwidth or the bureaucratic energy to bring the isolated island territories to justice. Distance from the mainland was used as a lousy scripted answers to stall various projects. Previously, it has been observed that the Indian diplomatic approach was quite uptight and high on protocol.

Thus, complex procedures to receive a clearance for even small projects was a harrowing experience. However, It is also important to keep in mind the conservation of forests and native tribes have again created a compelling issue when acquiring lands for developmental purposes. Another caveat is that building and constructing of strategic infrastructure is a multi-dimensional task which requires synergy between several state actors and other agencies. Also, the immediate politicisation of such critical assets have often diluted the real purpose of the discussion, concerned territories are sidelined in their own discussion and politics becomes paramount.

Modi’s foreign policy is on full throttle to recalibrate policy changes in the maritime domain. The Indian foreign policy has prompted the changes when China’s reinforcing its naval pull. Just like the British Raj in the past, today China is expanding its maritime sensibilities and power. Therefore, it is using the naval power to outreach to island states like Srilanka, Maldives to Seychelles and Mauritius in the Indian Ocean. While competing with China, India is building its own maritime backyard.

Chinese naval analysts have on numerous occasion called A&N Archipelago as a metal chain to block Chinese access to the Straits of Malacca. China has gone further to claim that India is building an ‘Iron Curtain’ in the Indian Ocean. Well, this is expected as China has not faced any prior significant resistance while expanding its footprints in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) barring India.

The upgradation of the infrastructure in the A&N islands is a comprehensive strategy which will not only essay a reliable maritime stronghold for Indian security perimeter, but also have ability to strengthen and extend benign friendship with its cherished maritime partners the Indo-Pacific.  Port Blair can potentially become a regional hub vis a vis the Indian Ocean to South East Asia. A strategically enlightened India shall leave no chance to bring the situation in its favour and present some productive and constructive actionable outcomes.