The ongoing war between Israel and Hamas has brought to the forefront the single biggest challenge that the regional normalisation process was expected to face at some point, that of the issue of Palestine. From reports of United States (US) diplomats raising concerns with Washington D.C. of losing face in the region, the conflict has passed many red lines over the last month.
One strategic shift and two tactical realignments. These were the driving forces of geopolitics in West Asia in recent years, until October 7. All were interrelated. The United States, the reigning superpower of the region since the end of the Second World War, had begun shifting its strategic focus to more conventional rivals such as Russia and China. But, to maintain its hold over and interests in the region, what the U.S. sought to do was to bring two of the pillars of its regional policy, Israel, and the Gulf Arabs, closer. The Abraham Accords were a result of this policy, which was rolled out by the Donald Trump administration and embraced by the U.S. President, Joe Biden. A common Jewish-Arab front in a relatively peaceful West Asia would allow the U.S. to free up resources from the region which it could use elsewhere.
The conflict is expediting many changes in regional dynamics, with the growing presence of Russia and China offering regional players alternatives to an American vision.
On the other side, the US’ deprioritisation of West Asia led Gulf Arabs to make their own tactical changes in foreign policy for a more predictable and stable relationship in the region. This opened an opportunity for China, which has good ties with countries across the Gulf, to play the role of a peacemaker. The result was the Iran-Saudi reconciliation agreement. The US’ response to the Saudi-Iran détente was to double down on the Abraham Accords. The Biden administration invested itself in talks between the Saudis and the Israelis. Then came the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel.
US President Joe Biden continued the Middle East policy of Trump and took it to another level by trying to normalise relations between two hitherto implacable adversaries – Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Perhaps a fear of Iran’s growing assertiveness also drove the Arab countries towards establishing friendly ties with Israel. These policies shift inevitably meant backing away from their traditional position on Palestine and aligned well with US policy towards the Middle East.
Surprisingly, the Global South seems to stand with Russia and China against the US-led pro-Israeli geopolitical formation, in stark contrast to its condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This could pose serious long-term threats to US strategic goals not only in the Middle East, but also in Africa and the Asia-Pacific, where it seeks to contain the influence of China.
However, the recent emergency session of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) along with the Arab League held in Riyadh to discuss Gaza showcased the lack of an Arab consensus beyond condemnation and the divergent long-term interests of participating states. Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi also attended, meeting his Saudi counterpart after more than a decade following a diplomatic détente achieved earlier this year brokered by China. But for the likes of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and others, strategic interests at play are long-term and the current inflection point poses a challenge to their vision. Over the past few years, diplomatic and strategic reorientation within the region highlighted rapidly shifting interests, moving from a history of conflict to a future where functional stability is seen of essence.
But for the likes of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and others, strategic interests at play are long-term and the current inflection point poses a challenge to their vision. Over the past few years, diplomatic and strategic reorientation within the region highlighted rapidly shifting interests, moving from a history of conflict to a future where functional stability is seen of essence. The Abraham Accords, signed in 2021, launched a new era of cooperation and normalisation not only between the Arab states and Israel but also between the US and the wider region.
In this respect, the UAE’s response to both Hamas’s terror attack against Israel and the latter’s subsequent military operations in Gaza has been both tempered and, for many, unexpected. Abu Dhabi’s initial response was to condemn Hamas’ actions against Israel, calling it a “serious and grave escalation”. Since then, the Emiratis have maintained a level of balance, but cracks within the Accords system seemed to be visible. While the UAE reaffirmed their backing for what the Accords stand for, their partners in Bahrain, who had also normalised relations with Israel, paused trade and recalled their ambassador for consultations.
Even if Hamas’s actions were not primarily intended to disrupt the above narratives, doing so would be a big boon. A Saudi normalisation with Israel, the former being home to the Two Holy Mosques, would be a tectonic event. It would also re-draw the lines in the sand geostrategically, with an Arab-Israeli block with American backing standing in unity against Iran, an unpalatable prospect for the Shia state. In response, Iran, over the years, has perhaps mobilised the most utilitarian version of a strategy once envisioned by Pakistan’s erstwhile military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, that of targeting an adversary through a “thousand cuts”. While Zia failed in this endeavour against his adversary India, the Iranians, under the late Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani who was assassinated by the US in 2020, through their construct of a vast concoction of militias across Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon aimed at deterring Israel and if needed, the Arabs, seem to have succeeded.
However, despite the ongoing scramble to find a political and diplomatic sweet spot, it is unlikely that these new Arab-Israel mechanisms will collapse given the Gazan conflict or due to a more confrontational posture between Arab states and Iran. And much like the UAE, the Saudis were also moving towards a normalisation process with Israel. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), only days before the Hamas attack, had said in an interview that the Kingdom is inching closer every day towards normalising ties with Israel but added caveats that the success of such an initiative also depended on Israeli deliverables on Palestine.
Even if Hamas’s actions were not primarily intended to disrupt the above narratives, doing so would be a big boon. A Saudi normalisation with Israel, the former being home to the Two Holy Mosques, would be a tectonic event. It would also re-draw the lines in the sand geostrategically, with an Arab-Israeli block with American backing standing in unity against Iran, an unpalatable prospect for the Shia state. In response, Iran, over the years, has perhaps mobilised the most utilitarian version of a strategy once envisioned by Pakistan’s erstwhile military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, that of targeting an adversary through a “thousand cuts”. While Zia failed in this endeavour against his adversary India, the Iranians, under the late Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani who was assassinated by the US in 2020, through their construct of a vast concoction of militias across Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon aimed at deterring Israel and if needed, the Arabs, seem to have succeeded.
The basic assumption of the Abraham Accords – that there could be peace in the Middle East without addressing the Palestinian question – has come unstuck.
When the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Morocco signed the Abraham Accords in 2020, Israel did not make any concessions for the Palestinians. This was the clearest sign yet that Arabs, especially Gulf Arabs, were ready to delink the Palestine question from their engagement with Israel, which boosted Tel Aviv’s efforts to localise the Palestine issue — to treat it as a mere security nuisance while continuing the occupation without consequences.
The Arab standpoint
Both the Arabs and Israel were ready to sidestep the Palestine question and chart a new course of partnership. But new regional realities emerged after October 7. The Palestine issue has now come back to the fore of the West Asian geopolitical cauldron.
Second, Israel’s disproportionate and indiscriminate attack on Gaza has triggered massive protests across the Arab Street, mounting enormous pressure on monarchs and dictators. Arab countries, which witnessed violent destabilising street protests and civil strife just 10 years ago, cannot completely turn away from the growing pan-Arab sympathy with the Palestinians and the antipathy towards Israel.
Third, there is always the Iran factor. Ever since the Palestine issue got re-regionalised, Iran has stepped up its pro-Palestine rhetoric and called for collective action against Israel, while its proxies, the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, have launched limited attacks on Israel. Iran is trying to claim the leadership of the Islamic world, bridging the Shia-Sunni divide. This has left Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries with difficult choices. They can either ignore the anger in the Arab Street, letting Iran take up the cause and go ahead with the planned peace agreement with Israel or halt the talks and return to the original King Abdullah Initiative, which called for the formation of an independent Palestine state based on the 1967 border in return for Arab recognition of Israel.
Regional tactics
The Iran-Saudi reconciliation, under Chinese mediation, itself was a setback for the U.S. In recent years, Arab countries have also shown an increasing hunger for autonomy. The UAE and Saudi Arabia refused to join American sanctions against Russia after the Ukraine war. Saudi Arabia continued its Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Plus cooperation with Moscow, defying Washington’s requests and diktats. China is playing an increasingly greater role in the Gulf, which includes secret plans to build a military facility in the UAE. The current crisis is expediting these changes in the regional dynamics. With the Saudi-Israel peace plan derailed and the Iranian President having visited the Kingdom to discuss Israel’s war on Gaza, what Washington is witnessing is the limits of the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords and the widening scope of the China-brokered Iran-Saudi détente.
India and the I2U2
For the I2U2, the ongoing crisis is a setback, but not an existential one. The minilateral format may lose some steam in the coming months but remains important as an institution. However, the ideation of it as a nimbler diplomacy design with successful delivery mechanisms, a potential alternative to post-WWII international frameworks, is yet to be proven. Perhaps this crisis is an opportune time for such minilaterals to work with pre-existing regional forums to show their worthiness. The US–Israel block within the I2U2 is operating more on a bilateral level with the UAE maintaining both distance and balance. India is also walking a tightrope in the crisis when it comes to balancing its own foreign policy and domestic political compulsions. While New Delhi abstained from a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) call towards demanding a humanitarian truce in Gaza, it voted against Israel a few days later again at the UNGA denouncing Israeli settlements gnawing into Palestinian territories (India has voted in favour of this resolution annually). This fed into New Delhi’s stance for a sovereign Palestinian nation, a two-state solution, and maintained a voting balance between Arab and Israeli interests.
The situation in Gaza is effectively back to the pre-2005 days, but the geopolitical reality is entirely different from the early 2000s when the U.S. was the sole superpower in the region. Russia and China may not replace America in West Asia in the near future given the U.S.’s huge military presence, but the growing footprint of other great powers is offering space for better manoeuvrability for regional players. By tying itself deeply with Mr. Netanyahu’s brutal, endless war on Gaza, the Biden administration has put the U.S. in a difficult position in a region that is already in a flux.
At the end we can say that the Hamas attack has rekindled the centrality of the Palestinian crisis, that any future design of the region, economic or political, cannot ignore Palestinians. Hamas’s message through terror was as much for the Arabs as it was for the Israelis.
