The J&K has always been and continues to be a complex affair. The problem encompasses a complicated relationship with Pakistan with an ongoing proxy conflict sponsored by it. That conflict is multi-dimensional stretching from an active Line of Control (LoC) with a non-existent ceasefire, intermittent infiltration of terrorists and war-making wherewithal, infusion of Islamic radicalism in the Kashmir Valley, constant promotion of alienation through extreme vigilantism, street turbulence and a spectrum of terrorist violence. While the year 2017 had begun with a distinct disadvantage of a poor ratio in terms of own casualties against terrorist elimination, it ended on a positive note with the security forces having regained a much higher level of domination and the Government’s clamp-down on financial networks producing far greater dividends in the sphere of street turbulence.
A common misnomer over years has been that the winter period is a time of relative calm in the Valley. That myth has once again been busted. With the international strategic environment relatively unstable, China attempting to play a more proactive role in South Asia and Afghanistan in a state of turbulence, Pakistan has upped the ante in J&K. Drawing strategic confidence from its strong relationship with China and attempting to pressurise the US into concessions, Pakistan is seeking to increase the temperature on its eastern front with India. With a weak civilian government in place, the Pakistan Army rules the roost. It considers its interests to be linked with enhanced turbulence in J&K so as to project to the US its inability to cooperate on Afghanistan and justify resistance to the US pressure.
A new strategic dimension has also emerged after last year’s 72 days long Doklam standoff at the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet border. Experts generally agree that a Doklam 2 by China is likely to be in the offing as early as 2018 itself. It will be completely in favour of China should the Indo-Pak borders also remain tense and the J&K issue continued to draw attention.
In light of the above, the winter of 2017-18 has been as active as envisaged. This is not necessarily worrisome except that it sets the stage for a hotter summer in the
traditional areas of conflict. With local terrorist recruitment at a higher figure than in preceding years and some additional terrorists having sneaked in during the campaigning season of 2017 and the mild winter of 2018 thus far, the advantage gained by our forces seems to have been neutralised by Pakistan’s Deep State and the Separatists. With over 210 terrorists killed in 2017, the numbers would have been substantially lower in 2018 but that’s not to be. Thus the tempo of intelligence gathering and the focus of counter-terror operations will have to be both at the LoC in terms of further countering infiltration and on South Kashmir’s volatile Kulgam- Anantnag-Shupiyan belt where more efforts towards recruitment will need to be neutralized.
In the prevailing climate with anticipated high levels of violence in the hinterland in 2018, the stage is being set by Pakistan by ensuring a volatile and tense LoC in the Jammu sector south of the Pir Panjal. While Pakistan itself has suffered heavy losses at the LoC this investment by it is considered meaningful in terms of keeping the Pak friendly terrorist cadres motivated, preventing a fade effect of the J&K issue from the eyes of the international community and possibly probing for a more active engagement through the next summer in conjunction with Pakistan’s all-weather friend, China. The Indian Army’s response has been robust in keeping with the freedom of action given by the Government. In the course, there will be and there have been losses of both soldiers and civilians which will cause national concern. Most experts agree that the one way of stopping Pakistan’s adventurism on the LoC is to force an unacceptable increase in cost for the actions it takes.
There is an offensive and defensive dimension to it. The offensive encompasses a vertical and horizontal escalation of the LoC engagements so that it is no longer limited to Pakistan’s choice areas and selection of weapons. There are a large number of sectors in which Indian domination exists and the blocking of logistics movement there will impose on Pakistan a tremendous cost; such as along the Lipa to Kel area of the Neelum Valley. The defensive dimension envisages rapid hardening of the defensive infrastructure along the LoC and immediate construction of the 14460 bunkers already sanctioned for the protection of the civil population. This conflict is not ending anytime too soon but the earliest we prepare ourselves to withstand Pakistan’s onslaught the quicker and harder we can respond.
Lastly, the unfortunate incident involving the escape of Abu Hanzula from the Maharaja Hari Singh Hospital has dented the otherwise flawless reputation of the JK Police which remains one of our finest counter-terror forces in the country. It will never be too soon if the Government goes deep into the functioning of the Central Jail, Srinagar.
(The writer is former GOC of Srinagar based 15 Corps)
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