Abhishek Pratap Singh
In a recent turn of events between China and India the visit of His Holiness Dalai lama to Arunanchal Pradesh has drawn noticeable concern from China. In an unceremonious set of reactions, China displayed its anguishes with the visit relating it to an ‘unsettled border dispute’ with India in the eastern sector, also referring to its commitment to defend its ‘core interest’ vis a vis India.
However, the context of this visit and background of India-China relation in regard to Tibet makes a compelling case for Chinese ‘unfounded concern’ in the given context.
Looking back at the history of Indo- China border dispute, the ‘Tibet card’ has been well played by the Chinese at different times. Firstly, this became a point of
context for Chinese in their diplomatic negotiations with India on border dispute between 1957 and 1962.
Chinese seem to have overplayed the notion of India’s involvement in Tibetan uprising in mid 1950s. This was the time when the role of the United States investigative agency, CIA, was more vital and decisive in order to escalate problems in Tibet.
The use of Tibet card also forms key component of ‘Forward Policy School’ of thought in China and in the West in regard to 1962 India-China war which shifts the blame for it on Indian policy choices. In both the cases the objective assessment of facts suggest a rather different and truthful theory. Interestingly, in both the cases India’s role had been peaceful and justified with no provocation to China.
Rather than questioning the presence of Thubten Norbu in US since July, 1951 as a ‘motivating factor’ behind the Tibetan uprising in 1950s, China seems to have ignored the Indian reprimand of Gyalo Thondup in 1953 at Gangtok to warn him in person not to carry out political activities on the Indian soil.
Simply putting India has no such role in CIAs covert operation in Tibet. Rather China took the advantage of India’s weak positioning and poor security intelligence in its favour in 1962 war.
It is largely accepted that Tibet had become independent when the Manchu Resident and the remnants of his military escort left its soil in January 1913. In between 1913 to 1949 China was more using ‘assertion’, rather ‘exertion’, over Tibet on the basis of historical maps. After PLAs march into the Tibet in October 1950 and signing of ‘Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” (17-point Agreement) , Tibet almost found itself incorporated with China.
During the signing of ‘Panchsheel Agreement’ in April 1954 between both the countries, India recognized the ‘Tibet region of China’ as a part of the PRC. But the same was not reciprocated by China in terms of India’s sovereignty on Jammu and Kashmir (JK).
Even China has also not spoken officially on the ‘One India Policy’ as put forward by Indian Minister of External Affairs, Smt. Sushma Swaraj.
China must understand that ever since his stay in India, Dalai Lama has been never allowed to ‘play politics’ nor India desires the idea of playing Tibet card with China. Also this is his ‘sixth visit’ to the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is an integral part of India. Dalai Lama enjoys respect of Indians as a ‘religious leader’ , so is widely celebrated amongst all. The state sends representation to Indian Parliament and the system of government is organised there according to the Indian constitution. The reaction of China against his visit holds no valid reason, except demonstrating her political anxiety.
China only started referring to it as ‘Southern Tibet’ in 2006 in its official records. If we look back at the history, this stands true of the Chinese ‘changing position’ on the border negotiations with India as well.
At the time when the theatre of global politics has shifted to Asia the political cooperation between India and China is necessary. This is preliminary to realize the dream of ‘Asian Century’ as suggested by Prime Minister Narendra Mod. While Manmohan-Jintao era saw ‘strategic partnership’ between India and China, the new leadership led by Modi-Xi desires to move towards ‘comprehensive developmental partnership’ between both the countries. There is enough space for both to prosper and secure their national interest.
In the given context some wider economic cooperation in terms of ‘sectoral engagement’ between both the states has increased in areas like sister city, railways, infrastructure and manufacturing. However, the political context of bilateral relations has not moved forward. On the issue of India’s membership to the NSG and listing of Pakistan-based Masood Azhar in UN list of terrorist China has found less reasonable excuses against India.
And now its opposition to Dalai Lama’s visit has witnessed widespread reaction in India. China must realize that it needs to reflect upon aspirational India and not allow any untimely opportunity to affect Indian sensitivities. It takes much time to regain the ‘lost trust’ between two countries. In case of India and China ,the level of ‘high trust deficit’ is already an accepted fact.
Considering China’s desire to be a dominant world power, it must act more prudently rather than being more reactive to a rightful visit by any religious leader who symbolises the message of peace.
Rather than being ‘over protective’ about its security interests, China must act as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the conduct of its diplomacy and bilateral relations.
(The writer is a JNU research scholar)
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