The media manipulation to describe Shri Narendra Modi as a mass murderer while simultaneously painting Shri Rajiv Gandhi as a secular hero has only one parallel in recent human history – the painting of Saddam Hussein as a beast by the Western media followed by the American invasion and capture of Iraq. The most vicious communal violence that occurred in post-Independence India was in Delhi in 1984, when nearly 3,000 Sikhs were slaughtered by Congress goons in purely one-sided violence. Ironically, that was the only occasion when an attempt was made to justify the killings, by Rajiv Gandhi who said that the ground shakes when a big tree falls. Yet Rajiv Gandhi remains a secular hero. There have been about half-a-dozen riots of the scale of Gujarat-2002, with deaths of different communities in similar proportions. Bhagalpur in 1989, Mumbai in 1993, earlier in Meerut-Malliana and Ahmedabad itself. They all occurred under Congress rule, and no one so much as remembers the names of the then Congress Chief Ministers. Yet Shri Modi, who never even hinted at any justification, was marked out as a “murderer”
Immediately after 26/11, public passion against the Congress governments at the State and Centre was running high. That anger was natural and rightful in a democracy – which punishes governments for their failures and forces extant governments to correct themselves. Yet a slew of TV news channels very cleverly converted the anger into a hatred for “all politicians” – as if the opposition BJP was as accountable for 26/11 as the ruling Congress!! And the public innocently fell for it
One may note how, in the middle of the election campaign, the news of the suicide of Priyanka’s father-in-law was meticulously blacked out. This does not happen in any healthy functional democracy, where the private lives of prominent individuals are always under the scanner. When lady Priyanka made it to the news, it was with her “brilliant” statement – “mai apni daadi ki saree may kaisi lagti hoon?” – headline-flashed carefully across all UP newspapers just on the eve of the third phase of polls. And the Congress won the bulk of its seats from this phase. What synchronisation!
How the “pub-attack” issue in Mangalore was highlighted beyond any rationality. The attackers were not BJP/RSS men and they were behaving likewise even under non-BJP state governments; no woman was even touched by the attackers and it was only their male companions who were beaten; and surprisingly, the same day as the pub-attack, three doctors on a morning walk on a Bengaluru pavement were overrun and killed on the spot by a car driven by a youth who had been drinking all through the previous night – yet this incident did not even find mention in the TV channels!
During the high growth rate period in the later phase of NDA rule, the media repeatedly made the point that this is a consequence of the “liberalisation” policies started by Dr. Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister. When “Chandrayaan” reached the moon, the media blanked out the fact that the entire mission was conceived, funded and even named by the Vajpayee-led NDA government, the only contribution of the Congress government was that it did not kill the project.
How the nationwide bandh called by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad during the Amarnath land agitation was mocked by the news channels – most of the Hindi channels simply carried a running commentary on how a man who was taking his father, who had had a heart-attack, to a hospital somewhere in Haryana, was blocked by the bandh and the inhumanity of the bandh supporters.
One can go on with examples, but by this time it is pretty evident that the two components of the Public Opinion Maker (POM) space – TV news and newsprint – had been playing a blatantly anti-BJP game. And in 2009 they made up 80 per cent of POM space.
Having seen the evidences, we now move on to the facts and then the causes. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the share of pro-BJP-ideology elements in each of the three components of the POM, and hence the net share of pro-BJP-ideology elements in total POM space, over the past twenty years. Again, these represent a qualitative analysis and not based on hard data; the background information is of just that level of accuracy that would enable us to derive our concepts. Since it is not possible to objectively identify “pro-BJP-elements” within the “distributed opinion makers”, its share in this component is taken at a constant level of one-third (33 per cent).
Three interesting points may be noticed in fig. 2. First, the steep increase seen in pro-BJP share between 1996 and 2001, mostly in the TV news component but also in newspapers. The reasons are, first, reduction in government control and interference (note this was also the period when Congress influence was waning), second, the favourable environment created by the Kargil war, and third, the regional outspread of the BJP into traditionally “weak” areas like the South, Bengal and Orissa, etc.. The share of pro-BJP elements in total POM space however is not seen to increase with equal sharpness, because (see Fig. 1) the share of “distributed opinion makers” component (where pro-BJP penetration is relatively higher) in net POM space is simultaneously reducing, while the percentage share of pro-BJP elements in TV newspace, in spite of rapid increase, remains quite low.
The second point of note is the sharp fall in pro-BJP share between 2002 and 2005, both in TV newspace and newsprint. There are two reasons for it; first, the Gujarat riots enabled the anti-BJP elements in both these components to unleash an anti-BJP blitzkrieg – which affected it sharply in the newly-emergent support areas (see above) but not so in its traditional areas. Second, the creation of a plethora of regional TV news channels among whom the pro-BJP elements could not establish an influence. The increasing share of these channels reduced the proportional share of pro-BJP elements.
The third point of note is the consequence of the above two combined with the baseline information of fig. 1. The solid line in fig. 2 shows this: the net share of pro-BJP-ideology elements, which was of the order of 30 per cent at the peak of Sri Ramjanambhoomi agitation, rose to 33 per cent post-Kargil, had come down to about 25 per cent in 2004 and is only 20 per cent in 2009.
Now we are in a position to view explicitly how the POM altered the electoral outcome in the 2004 and 2009 general elections. Figure 3 shows a number line varying from -100 at left end to +100 at right. This is the “Number Line of National Mood”. A value of -100 (left end) denotes a value of national mood – or call it undercurrent – that is completely pro-Congress. A value of +100 denotes completely pro-BJP. Zero denotes perfectly neutral. The two directed arrows above the number line illustrate what happened in the 2004 and 2009 general elections. In 2004, the starting national mood (say 4 months prior to elections) was +40. But the share of pro-BJP-ideology elements in the POM space was only 25 per cent. The distinctly anti-BJP POM pulled the +40 to a zero. No wonder the BJP’s chief strategists later diagnosed the result as “no national current, only an agglomeration of local currents”. Just as two waves of equal amplitude and frequency but exactly 180° out of phase create a zero, here a positive national mood in favour of the BJP was fully neutralised by the POM with no resultant wave visible anywhere. In the precise absence of a visible wave lay implicit the dialectics of the underlying processes – the reality of what had actually taken place, -30
2009 was relatively explicit, as the starting position was a +20 in favour of BJP (following defeats in Rajasthan and Delhi, and Navin Pattanaik’s treachery). Share of pro-BJP elements in POM space had further reduced to 20 per cent. As a result the POM pulled the national mood 50 points to the left, landing at -30. And now nobody disputed the existence of a pro-Congress undercurrent, quite oblivious of the movements and the forces that lay hidden behind it. This explains the unbelievable electoral angularities listed earlier in this note.
Now we come to the basic question of why the share of pro-BJP-ideology elements, call it the RSS school of thought, remains so low among the two organised components of the POM, and is going down steadily. There are two very profound reasons for it.
The first flows from the prevailing conflict of civilizations. This, particularly in the context of its ramifications on our Hindu civilisation, is too complex a subject to be dealt with in this note. A good explanation may be found in the article titled “Hindu Rashtra, the Conflict of Civilizations and Le Chatelier’s Principle” which is available on the link http://www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules.php?name= Content&pa=s howpage&pid=267&page=10 (This was published in the Dec 14, 2008 issue of the Organiser weekly). In a nutshell, it is natural for contemporary civilisations to try to impose themselves on each other. Obviously, the contemporaneously dominant civilisations will try to do so more forcefully on the weaker ones, than the other way round. An easy means of so doing is to capture the institutionalised Public Opinion Makers of these civilisations – which means the TV-news and Newspapers in their POM spaces. In our context the Hindu civilisation is the victim, and the Western – mostly Anglo-American aided by a strong Church+Left content, the aggressor. As the mentioned article explains, the coming to power of the BJP around the turn of the millennium redoubled the drive of the aggressors to capture our POM space – and hence the gradual fall in pro-BJP-ideology content in our Chatelier’s Principle” which is available on the link http://www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules.php?name= Content&pa=s howpage&pid=267&page=10 (This was published in the Dec 14, 2008 issue of the Organiser weekly). In a nutshell, it is natural for contemporary civilizations to try to impose themselves on each other. Obviously, the contemporaneously dominant civilizations will try to do so more forcefully on the weaker ones, than the other way round. An easy means of so doing is to capture the institutionalised Public Opinion Makers of these civilisations – which means the TV-news and Newspapers in their POM spaces. In our context the Hindu civilization is the victim, and the Western – mostly Anglo-American aided by a strong Church+Left content, the aggressor. As the mentioned article explains, the coming to power of the BJP around the turn of the millennium redoubled the drive of the aggressors to capture our POM space – and hence the gradual fall in pro-BJP-ideology content in our POM since that period. The Gujarat riots simply offered them an opportunity to launch a blitzkrieg.
But that is only part of the explanation. Why did the defenders of the Hindu civilization remain sitting ducks in the face of this offensive? Why did the people who fought and rolled back eight hundred years of Islamic invasion from our frontiers, and one-and-a-half centuries of insidious European attempt to undermine our mind and character, fail to respond to the situation? One, they simply – and unfortunately – did not even realise what game was going on around them. And two, the most pre-eminent among the defenders of the Hindu civilization in this day & age, namely the RSS school of thought, had been trained instinctively to work and sacrifice without ever beating their own drums. The ideal was the foundation of a building – never to be seen, but the bedrock on which the edifice stands. A very noble ideal, but unfortunately, this very ingrained instinct became a weakness in facing up to the new form of invasion.
People trained in the RSS school implicitly abhorred propaganda. This naturally carried over into the BJP. Thus while every small political party in the country – right from the “Dravidian” ones, the Akalis, and even the born-yesterday outfit of film-hero Chiranjeevi had their own TV channels, the BJP steadfastly avoided it. More importantly, they even avoided implanting their agents into “neutral” news channels and papers. They had forgotten that even in the Mahabharat, Dharmaraja Yudhisthir had to be balanced by down-to-earth Arjun & Bhim to face up to the wicked Kauravas.
Thus it happened that on the one hand the institutionalised components of the POM kept on expanding more and more into total POM space pushing the stable source of BJP support – the “distributed opinion makers” – into a corner, while on the other hand the organised foreign agencies continued to increase the width and depth of their influence within these institutionalised components – their only challenge coming not from the defenders of nationalism but from petty regional groups serving their own local interests. This is what is shown in figures 1 & 2. And the unfortunate consequences are illustrated in fig. 3.
Now it is time to move from an analysis of the past into preparation for the future. Purely from the political perspective, the RSS school of thought has to increase its share in the institutionalised POM space. If not, its political sway and gradually its ability to influence Bharatvarsha and the world at large (Krinvanto Vishwam Aryam?) will wither away with time. This has to be done both at the national and regional levels. Without, the BJP might still win assembly elections in its traditional areas of influence – because in these elections the “distributed opinion makers” will continue to play a relatively larger role for some time to come. However, when it comes to emerging into traditionally weak regions, as well as fighting national elections – its contraction in the POM space will push it out of serious reckoning – in spite of a hundred positive factors, in traditional electoral terms, working in its favour.
In its journey to occupy more of the institutionalised POM space, the RSS school of thought has to be careful not to fall into the “purist” trap. This essentially implies preaching to the converted – and comes very easily to ideologically committed and cadre-based families. The RSS ideological school runs a number of publications, which serve as means of internal communication and motivation. They cannot be considered as part of POM space because they are not “public”. The first requirement for getting into this space is credibility of neutrality. A good example is NDTV – which is sponsored by Church elements with some leftist overlap. It has good credibility among middle-class Indians who do not suspect its neutrality and appreciate its professionalism. Yet most of the anti-BJP tricks – like the Mangalore pub-attack propaganda, Kandhamal, demonisation of Shri Varun Gandhi & Shri Narendra Modi, the 26/11 “hatred for politicians” trick and many more as mentioned before, have been spawned by this channel.
The RSS school of thought may aim to strongly back at least one English and two Hindi channels at national level, and at least one channel in every region (i.e. linguistic state). They must pass the test of credibility of neutrality. Which implies that they should be seen to be dealing overtly with Congress, leftists and others similar to the way they deal with the BJP – and also sometimes show programmes which are not preferred by the RSS school. They should not overstress on activities of Hindu Nationalist organisations. Otherwise they will simply end up preaching to the converted. Further, they should be professionally excellent so that they quickly occupy more space. And a similar effort should be made in the newspaper space. They should be able to establish themselves in their respective segments within the next two years; else it will be too late for the next general elections.
The objective of this note is not to belittle all other causes that led to the BJP defeat. They are certainly relevant, and the party’s analysts will be able to identify them. There are significant differences between many of the factors leading to 2004 and 2009 electoral defeats. In 2004, worker demotivation was a major factor. This was caused by the absence of a visible mapping between party ideology and party’s governance. This grassroots’ demotivation was sought to be tempered by central organisation’s forcefulness, which in turn created over-centralisation and neglect of grassroots’ requirements. Even in 2009 the party has not been able to come out of the inertia of these ill-effects. Wherever the grassroots has been re-energised (like in Jharkhand, where Babulal Marandi’s resignation gave a shock to the centre which stopped interfering thenceforth) the party has done well, wherever it has been steamrolled (as in Uttarakhand) the party has done badly. Among other factors – the party’s Yuva Morcha has to be significantly revitalised, and the RSS school of thought has to contribute to this.
Returning to the theme, there is no doubt that people trained in the pro-BJP-ideology school will have some difficulty in getting into the suggested indirect-propaganda mode. But it is the same sort of difficulty and dilemma that Arjuna had faced at the start of the Kurukshetra battle. The cause of this nation, of this civilization, of humanity and of the greatest truth should be able to neutralize softer emotions that repels against show-business – just as Arjuna had to train his mind as well as his heart to fight against Bhishma Pitamah and Guru Dronacharya. And like with Arjuna, here too Shri Krishna will be amongst us, leading and guiding us all the time …..
CONCLUSIONS
The gradual contraction of the influence of the RSS school of thought in the “Public Opinion Maker” space is the fundamental reason for successive BJP defeats. The BJP and the ideological school behind it cannot hope to attain a commanding position in national politics and influence the evolution of our nation and thence the world without first occupying a certain threshold position in this (itself evolving) POM space. While doing so it should be careful not to fall into the “purist” trap, i.e. preaching only to the converted, which comes easily to ideologically committed and cadre-based families.
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