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World

Meta report exposes Chinese bots fueling Khalistani extremism in Bharat; Use fake Sikh names in Facebook and Instagram

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WEB DESK

On May 31, Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, announced the discovery of a Chinese-backed social media network involved in “inauthentic behaviour” directed at India. The company disclosed the uncovering of a sophisticated anti-India network, dubbed “Operation K,” which focused on influencing the global Sikh community’s discussions regarding the death of Khalistani separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada.

In the 33-page report, Meta detailed its removal of 37 Facebook accounts, 9 Instagram accounts, 13 Facebook pages, and 5 groups—all originating from China. Some of these pages had amassed up to 2,700 followers, while the groups had 1,300 members. The purged Instagram accounts had fewer than 100 followers.

These accounts were central to promoting Khalistani extremism and Sikh separatism not only in India but also in countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom.

Meta’s report highlighted that the pro-Khalistani propaganda was not confined to Facebook. Bots associated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also used other social media platforms, including X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.

“This activity– targeted at multiple services, including ours, Telegram and X (former Twitter) included several clusters of fake accounts, including one with links to an unattributed CIB network from China targeting India and the Tibet region that we disrupted in early 2023. Some of these clusters amplified one another with most of their engagement coming from their own fake accounts, likely to make this campaign appear more popular than it was,” the report added.

“This operation used compromised and fake accounts—some of which were detected and disabled by our automated systems prior to our investigation—to pose as Sikhs, post content, and manage Pages and Groups,” the report stated.

The fake accounts, operated from China, attempted to create a fictitious activist movement called “Operation K” to incite Khalistani activities in Australia and New Zealand. Meta’s timely intervention successfully thwarted the disinformation campaign.

“We found and removed this activity early, before it was able to build an audience among authentic communities. They posted primarily in English and Hindi about news and current events, including images likely manipulated by photo editing tools or generated by artificial intelligence. Their posts covered topics such as floods in the Punjab region, the Sikh community worldwide, the Khalistan independence movement, the assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a pro-Khalistan independence activist in Canada, and criticism of the Indian government,” the report read.

These revelations emerged from Meta’s internal investigation into ‘coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB)’ in the region.

China, a strong ally of Pakistan, stands to gain from creating internal discord within India. During the Coronavirus pandemic, it sparked a standoff at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), leading to prolonged border tensions. Additionally, China has declared India’s Arunachal Pradesh as its territory and has a history of supporting insurgency in India’s North-East region. Collaborating with Pakistan’s ISI, China is now attempting to fuel Sikh separatism in the Indian state of Punjab.

As part of this strategy, China is seeking to garner support for Khalistan in countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom.

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